1The Federalist No. 1, [27 October 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New York. After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Fœderal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is...
2The Federalist No. 6, [14 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE three last numbers of this Paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different, and, perhaps, still more alarming kind, those which will in all probability flow from dissentions between the...
3The Federalist No. 7, [17 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say—precisely the same inducements, which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more...
4The Federalist No. 8, [20 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighbouring nations not...
5The Federalist No. 9, [21 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. A Firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty Republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid...
6The Federalist No. 11, [24 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points, about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has in fact commanded the most general assent of men, who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries, as with each other. There are...
7The Federalist No. 12, [27 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE effects of union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present enquiry. The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of...
8The Federalist No. 13, [28 November 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. AS connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of œconomy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another; and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are...
9The Federalist No. 15, [1 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IN the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavoured, my Fellow Citizens, to place before you in a clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together to...
10The Federalist No. 16, [4 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems....
11The Federalist No. 17, [5 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. AN objection of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said, that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb in itself those residuary...
12The Federalist No. 18, [7 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics associated under the Amphyctionic Council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present confederation of the American States. The members retained the character of independent and sovereign...
13The Federalist No. 19, [8 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic Body. In the early ages of Christianity Germany was occupied by...
14The Federalist No. 20, [11 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies, of a very remarkable texture; yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed. The Union is composed of seven co-equal and sovereign States, and each State or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In all important cases...
15The Federalist No. 21, [12 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events, which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments; I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects, which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe...
16The Federalist No. 22, [14 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IN addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing Fœderal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union. The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated...
17The Federalist No. 23, [18 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point, at the examination of which we are now arrived. This enquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches—the objects to be provided for by a Fœderal Government—the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of...
18The Federalist No. 24, [19 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. TO the powers proposed to be conferred upon the Federal Government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it rightly is this— that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which I shall now...
19The Federalist No. 25, [21 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT may perhaps be urged, that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State Governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be in reality an inversion of the primary principle of our political association; as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defence from the fœderal head to the...
20The Federalist No. 26, [22 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT was a thing hardly to be expected, that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean, which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we...
21The Federalist No. 27, [25 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT has been urged in different shapes that a constitution of the kind proposed by the Convention, cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This however, like most other things that have been alledged on that side, rests on mere general assertion; unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon...
22The Federalist No. 28, [26 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THAT there may happen cases, in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are unhappily maladies...
23The Federalist No. 29, [9 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE power of regulating the militia and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy. It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the...
24The Federalist No. 30, [28 December 1787] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT has been already observed, that the Fœderal Government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expence of raising troops, of building and equiping fleets, and all other expences in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not...
25The Federalist No. 31, [1 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IN disquisitions of every kind there are certain primary truths or first principles upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence, which antecedent to all reflection or combination commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of...
26The Federalist No. 32, [2 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences, which seem to be apprehended to the State Governments, from a power in the Union to controul them in the levies of money; because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State Governments, and a conviction of the...
27The Federalist No. 33, [2 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. The residue of the argument against the provisions in the constitution, in respect to taxation, is ingrafted upon the following clauses; the last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration, authorises the national legislature “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper , for carrying into execution the...
28The Federalist No. 34, [5 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shewn in my last number, that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have CO-EQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the...
29The Federalist No. 35, [5 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government in the article of revenue should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burthens to fall upon those...
30The Federalist No. 36, [8 January 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. WE have seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of...
31[The Federalist No. 49], [2 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , February 2, 1788. This essay appeared on February 5, 1788, in New-York Packet , and on February 6, 1788, in The [New York] Daily Advertiser . In the McLean The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York:...
32The Federalist No. 50, [5 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. IT may be contended perhaps, that instead of occasional appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, periodical appeals are the proper and adequate means of preventing and correcting infractions of the Constitution . It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude...
33The Federalist No. 51, [6 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. TO what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the...
34The Federalist No. 52, [8 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. FROM the more general enquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the government, relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the...
35[The Federalist No. 53], [9 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , February 9, 1788. This essay was printed on February 12 in New-York Packet . In the McLean The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). edition this essay is...
36The Federalist No. 54, [12 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives, relates to the apportionment of its members to the several States, which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the...
37The Federalist No. 55, [13 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another, and a very interesting point of view under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article indeed in the whole constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument, with...
38The Federalist No. 56, [16 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives, with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their...
39The Federalist No. 57, [19 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE third charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. Of all the objections which have been framed against the Fœderal Constitution, this is...
40The Federalist No. 58, [20 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand. It has been admitted that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will shew that like...
41The Federalist No. 59, [22 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorises the national Legislature to regulate in the last resort the election of its own members. It is in these words—“The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the...
42The Federalist No. 60, [23 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. WE have seen that an incontroulable power over the elections for the federal government could not without hazard be committed to the state legislatures. Let us now see what would be the dangers on the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever...
43The Federalist No. 61, [26 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections contained in the plan of the Convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification however that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided....
44The Federalist No. 62, [27 February 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. HAVING examined the constitution of the house of representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered, are—I. the qualifications of senators—II. the appointment of them by the state legislatures—III....
45The Federalist No. 63, [1 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. A FIFTH desideratum illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned; but the national councils will not possess that...
46The Federalist No. 65, [7 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE remaining powers, which the plan of the Convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the Executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the Executive will be the principal agent, the provisions...
47The Federalist No. 66, [8 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. A review of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavourable impressions, which may still exist, in regard to this matter. The first of these objections is, that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in...
48The Federalist No. 67, [11 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE Constitution of the executive department of the proposed government claims next our attention. There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is perhaps none, which has been inveighed against with less candor, or criticised with less judgment. Here the...
49The Federalist No. 68, [12 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THE mode of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit, that the election of the...
50The Federalist No. 70, [15 March 1788] (Hamilton Papers)
To the People of the State of New-York. THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation...