1. This letter has not been found.

2. John Jay’s letter to Randolph of 31 Jan. enclosed a duplicate of one to the secretary of 7 Jan. as well as a letter of Samuel Bayard to Jay of 27 Jan. and Jay’s answer the same day. In the latter, Jay briefly noted steps taken concerning Bayard’s agency and added a postscript: “Such is the Nature and Magnitude of the Business of these Capture cases, as that on certain occasions diplomatic and prudential, as well as legal Proceedings may be advisable.” Jay suggested “the Propriety of giving Mr Pinckney a general Superintendence over the Business, and authorizing him to give Mr Bayard such Instructions, as he may from time to time judge proper.”

Jay informed Randolph on 2 Feb. that he had taken “the three first opportunities … of writing to our Minister at Paris” to assure him that the treaty with England included “an express declaration that nothing contained in it, should be construed or operate against existing Treaties between the United States and other powers.” Jay also told Randolph that he had conveyed similar comments to John Quincy Adams, U.S. minister to the Netherlands, and to William Short, who was negotiating a treaty with Spain concerning navigation of the Mississippi River.

Jay’s letter to Randolph of 6 Feb. replied to the secretary’s letter of 3 Dec. 1794, which included Randolph’s expressed concern over British refusal to compensate Americans for the loss of slaves taken by the British during the Revolutionary War. Jay asked Randolph whether the impasse on that issue would have constituted “a good Reason for breaking up the negociation.” Responding to another matter Randolph had raised—that of the British surrendering western posts as agreed upon in the 1783 Treaty of Paris—Jay reiterated an earlier opinion that the ability of the United States to trade in the British West Indies compensated for British delays in complying. He also told Randolph, “We are not obliged by Treaty to permit France to sell Prizes in our ports. By denying that priviledge to all we adhere to the Line of Impartiality” (all in DNA: RG 59, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Great Britain). For Jay’s dispatches to Randolph of 5 and 22 Feb., see his letter to GW of 25 Feb., n.4.

3. Thomas Pinckney informed Randolph on 23 Feb. that he had received the secretary’s letters of 28 Nov. as well as those of 3, 9, 11, 18, 23, 25, 29, and 30 Dec. 1794, Randolph’s correspondence of 5 Feb. 1795, his commission, and related documents that referred to his mission to Spain. Pinckney accepted the “appointment with diffidence” and added, “you may be assured that no Exertions of which I am capable shall be wanting, to bring the Business committed to my charge to an happy Issue, to which I receive an additional Incitement from the delicate and friendly Motives which I am convinced gave rise to my being selected for this Negociation.” Pinckney discussed financial arrangements, and wrote part of the letter in cipher, which may have contained his comments about the impending treaty (DNA: RG 59, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Great Britain).

4. Randolph may be referring to Adams’s private letter to him of 18 Dec. 1794, written from The Hague. A statement in the letter-book copy of Adams’s correspondence notes that a duplicate of that letter included an attached note dated 26 December. “The report of the day,” Adams informed Randolph in a letter of 18 Dec., “whispered about as a great secret to every body, is that a truce has actually been signed as to all hostile operations upon the [Waal River], and that two persons are to be immediately dispatched to Paris to negotiate a peace.” Adams conveyed that information to Randolph, even though it contained “so many marks of a questionable authority,” because “waiting for certainty … would perhaps be too late.”

Adams’s note to Randolph of 26 Dec. confirmed the peace mission while adding that the information about a truce was “not confirmed.” Adams also cautioned that “From a variety of circumstances not absolutely conclusive, little is expected by any party to result from this mission. The character, principles and reputation” of the commissioners “occasion the greatest doubts as to its success.” Adams also expressed suspicion about the Dutch interest in the “prevalence … of moderate principles” and “the moderate party at Paris.” He noted “that upon the permanency of that power are founded not only hopes for peace, but ideas of a tide turning in favour of Royalty.” Since the only news from Paris was “by the public prints,” it was “impossible” for Adams “to judge what is the real situation of parties and opinions there” (both MHi: Adams Papers).

5. Adams’s letter to Randolph of 12–13 Jan. told of the allied attack and French counteroffensive that resulted in the latter’s possession of Worcum and the removal of British headquarters from Utrecht to Amersfoort. Adams added that the States General had issued a call to arms, but that it came too late “and is not expected to produce much effect.” The Dutch “hourly” expected the fall of Dort and Utrecht to the French.

Writing to Randolph on 19–20 Jan. from Amsterdam, Adams confirmed that Utrecht had, indeed, capitulated two days earlier. He described the surrender of Amsterdam on 19 Jan. and reported that on 18 Jan., “The Stadtholder with his family and Court left the Hague … they will probably go to England.” On the afternoon of 20 Jan., Gen. Jean-Charles Pichegru with 2,000 or 3,000 troops arrived in Amsterdam. French soldiers occupied Haarlem and had arrived at Dort. Within a few days, Adams surmised, the French would establish “complete and undisputed possession of the Province of Holland.”

Adams’s letter of 22 Jan. informed Randolph: “The States of Holland have given orders to all their officers and commanders to make no further resistance against the french armies … no disorders have taken place. No Massacres, no pillage, not even any personal insult to the conspicuous characters of the party heretofore dominant … In short at this moment it is scarcely possible for us who are spectators to conceive that what we have witnessed is in reality the complicated transaction of a foreign conquest and an internal revolution.”

Adams then turned to American concerns. “As the property belonging to the United States and their citizens in this Country could not be subject to the terms of a capitulation, I thought it might be of some utility to see the Commissaries, and give them notice of the expectation that the neutral privileges of American property will at all events be respected.” He met with a “perfectly satisfactory” reception.

In his letter to Randolph of 24 Jan., Adams described his meeting that morning with Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, head of the provisional representatives of Amsterdam, about U.S. interests in the Netherlands and future political developments there. Adams reminded Randolph that in his dispatch #3, dated 2 Nov. 1794, he had “requested eventual instructions, in order to be prepared for the event which has now taken place. At that time I could not foresee,” Adams wrote, “whether this country would retain its national existence or be annexed as a conquest to the french Republic. At present every appearance indicates that it will be considered as an allied sovereign power without having any of the forms of submission to France … If therefore the new order of things should become permanent” he required “instructions of the President to direct my conduct.” His credentials and commission “to the States general, will no doubt be de facto suspended, by their removal from the helm. But their dispersion being forcibly effected, will not by them be acknowledged legitimate, and it is to this day doubtful whether they will be deserted by all the Provinces. As to the new assembly of the United Provinces, in case they should establish themselves, de facto, as the successors of the States general. I do not think it within my competency to acknowlege them as such … so far as to transact any affair with them” (all DNA: Despatches from U.S. Ministers to the Netherlands).

In his letter to Randolph of 28 Jan. from Amsterdam, Adams described changes in the municipal administrative structure. Writing again to the secretary of state on 29 Jan., he discussed the creation of the provisional assembly and efforts to create a new system of government for the Netherlands. Adams informed Randolph of a rumor that the Dutch leaders might permit importation of flour, previously prohibited by the royal government, which had profited from a tax on grinding the grain. “The American Consignees,” Adams wrote, “have already had intimations to order the Shipment of flour in considerable quantities, but the caution, which so peculiarly characterizes the Merchants of this nation will prevent” action until official removal of the prohibition. He noted that a scarcity of flour and grain in the Netherlands should serve as an incentive for the purchase of American flour (both MHi: Adams Papers). Adams enclosed, for GW’s information, a copy of the proclamation issued when the French arrived at Amsterdam, which he had just received as “an official communication” from “the Representatives of the french people.”

Adams’s private letter to Randolph on 12 Feb. informed him about the completion of the “municipal and provincial Revolutions” in the provinces of Holland, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel. “They are already represented in the States General under the new system, and there can be no doubt but the other provinces will soon follow.” Adams briefly described the limited introduction of French assignats and efforts to stimulate importation of grain and flour (MHi: Adams Papers).

6. For Franco Petrus Van Berckel’s request, see Randolph to GW, 22 April, and n.1 to that document.

7. The letter of Gouverneur Morris to Randolph of 2 Jan. explained that because “The Cold has … shut up all Navigation,” anything he might report “would be an old story.” He then observed that “if Robespierre had been possest of personal Courage he was indubitably the Master of France.” Then he would have found it necessary, Morris opined, “to put the little prisoner on the Throne of his forefathers.” Morris also noted that the period “most deeply marked by the blood of the innocent” occurred when Robespierre had “absented himself” from the Committee of Public Safety, and he wondered why “that Band of Assassins of which the Committee was composed was not speedily led to that Scaffold which had so often exhibited the victims of their despotic Barbarity” (DLC: Gouverneur Morris Papers).

8. In his letter to Jay of this date, Randolph said that Jay’s dispatches had confirmed the secretary’s “determination, which I had taken with the approbation of the President … to go to New York immediately upon your arrival, if you should arrive during his absence at Mount Vernon.” GW planned to return “in eight or ten days.” Randolph desired to see Jay so quickly upon his return to the United States because 8 June marked the day the Senate would convene to debate the treaty. That document, explained Randolph, “has remained an inviolable secret, between the President and myself. Papers are prepared to accompany it to the Senate; and I am persuaded, that, when I tell you, that we do not propose to send any of my letters, subsequent to the receipt of the two projets on the 11th of November, you will appreciate the views of government, as they are intended. For the discussion of the treaty, we ought to be provided with a demonstration of our conduct towards France, and an answer to the questions arising upon the treaty itself” (DNA: RG 59, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions, 1791–1801).

Jay arrived in New York on 28 May but felt too ill to travel to Philadelphia as planned (see Jay to Randolph, 28 May, in DNA: RG 59, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Great Britain).