The unwillingness of the French expeditionary force to leave Rhode Island to combine with the Continental army for a concerted effort to oust the British from New York City frustrated both Major General Lafayette and GW.1 The two men again felt frustration when logistical failures foiled an opportunity to overwhelm an enemy force on Staten Island, New York.2 Not wanting to see the entire campaign season pass without some meaningful action against the British, GW watched for a chance to strike. Besides appeasing his aggressive inclination, a successful thrust might deter the British from sending troops to strengthen their southern army and solidify recent gains in that theater.

Before he could devise an attack on New York City that involved river crossings and rapid movements across water, GW needed to establish the availability of boats. An apparent query on the subject to Q.M. Gen. Timothy Pickering resulted in the latter’s detailed report on 6 November.3 With this generally favorable information, GW proceeded with more concrete plans.

While he crystallized his thinking, GW learned that Maj. Gen. William Heath wanted to send a powerful foraging party into Westchester County, N.Y., to obtain provisions for the troops in the New York Highlands, where he commanded. GW incorporated Heath’s forage into his own plans and advised his subordinate to delay its execution until further directions.4 Conducting distinct maneuvers at a distance added significant tactical complexities as well as command and control complications.

GW’s basic idea was to surprise the British fortifications on northern Manhattan, which he believed from intelligence were undermanned and vulnerable. To deceive the British of his real intention, prevent rapid redeployment of enemy troops to meet the main threat, and perhaps launch a supplemental attack if the situation became propitious, GW directed elements of his army to points in New Jersey that threatened Staten Island.5 The entire operation exhibited a scale and boldness that approached rashness for an army chronically short on supplies of every sort. It is likely that GW came to this realization.6

While it is impossible to know his mental calculations for certain, circumstances conspired against GW’s eagerness to launch an attack. Dr. James Thacher accompanied the detachment that moved south from the vicinity of West Point on the foraging expedition, which also would be positioned to aid the offensive. Thacher describes “a severe storm of rain” on the night of 21 Nov. that became “more violent the next day” and “rendered the roads extremely bad.” Arriving near Westchester, N.Y., “within eight miles of the enemy’s works at King’s-bridge,” on 23 Nov., the troops “kindled numerous fires in open view of the enemy, and in the evening the troops were ordered to leave the fires and retire back about two miles, and remain under arms prepared for battle.” A “severe storm of rain” on 24 Nov. “continued through the day.” The detachment withdrew to “near White Plains” and took “comfortless” shelter as the storm persisted. Withdrawal to the starting point occurred on 26 and 27 November.7

Lt. Enos Reeves related events on 24 Nov. and offered his surmise on the motivation for the army’s recent maneuvers when he wrote an undated letter to an unidentified friend from Totowa: “About ten o’clock we were passed in Review by his Excellency Genl Washington. … The morning being wet the orders of march were countermanded. Our baggage was to have been left on the ground with the tents standing. Where our destination was I cannot inform you. But there was fresh horses order’d for the artillery and ammunition wagons, and a large number of boats on wheels, with good teams to move them were waiting to attend us. The left wing of our Army, which is on the other side the North river have marched down as low as White Plains, waiting further orders. … It appears to me that the present movement and disposition of our Army is only a manœuvre in order to prevent the enemy from sending a reinforcement to South Carolina.”8

In his journal entry for 30 Nov., Thacher described GW’s overarching design and the demise of the operation: “It is now well understood that our detachment, under the pretext of a foraging expedition, was intended by the commander-in-chief to cöoperate with the main army in an attempt against the enemy’s post on York island. Boats, mounted on travelling carriages, have been kept with the army all the campaign. The Marquis de la Fayette, at the head of his beautiful corps of light-infantry, constantly advancing in front, was to have commenced the attack in the night, and the whole army was prepared to make a general attack on the enemy’s works. By some movement of the British vessels, or other cause, known only to the commander-in-chief and his confidential officers, this noble enterprise was unfortunately defeated. The campaign is now brought to a close, without effecting any very important object.”9 Curt instructions ended all activities related to the offensive.10 GW then promptly ordered his army into winter quarters.11 He subsequently shared his disappointment with at least one correspondent.12