1. For Stirling’s orders for this raid, see GW to Stirling, 13 Jan. (first letter), source note.

2. As early as 13 Jan., it was known in New York City that the Continental army was planning to attack Staten Island. New York printer Hugh Gaine wrote in his journal entry for 13 Jan.: “Whispers that the Rebels meditate an Attack in Staten Island” (Ford, Journals of Hugh Gaine, description begins Paul Leicester Ford, ed. The Journals of Hugh Gaine, Printer. 1902. Reprint. [New York] 1970. description ends 2:75). British brigadier general Thomas Stirling, commanding on Staten Island, was alerted by five deserters from Major General Stirling’s command (see Baurmeister, Revolution in America, description begins Carl Leopold Baurmeister. Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals, 1776–1784, of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces. Translated and annotated by Bernhard A. Uhlendorf. New Brunswick, N.J., 1957. description ends 338).

3. Stirling was mistaken in his belief that reinforcements could reach Staten Island from New York City; futile British efforts to cross troops to the island apparently deceived him into thinking they could make the crossing. In his report to Gen. Henry Clinton for 15 and 16 Jan., Lt. Gen. Wilhelm von Knyphausen, temporary commander of the royal forces in the New York City area, stated: “Every attempt was made to send Reinforcements from New York, upon the Evening of the 15th and before day break in the morning of the 16th but it was found impracticable; the Ice having totally obstructed the Navigation, and a similar exertion from Dennys’s Ferry [Long Island, N.Y.], was attended with little better success” (Knyphausen’s report, 1 Jan.–24 Feb. 1780, MiU-C: Clinton Papers). Lt. Col. John Graves Simcoe, whose Queen’s Rangers were stationed on the island, later wrote that “General Kniphausen, on the first signal of Staten Island being attacked, embarked troops to support it. The enemy in the dark of the evening saw these vessels, (which, whether the passage could be effected or not, were wisely directed to be kept plying off and on,) but they did not wait to see if they could reach the island, which in fact the drifting ice prevented, but immediately determining to retreat, they effected it the next morning” (Simcoe, Operations of the Queen’s Rangers, description begins John Graves Simcoe. Simcoe’s Military Journal: A History of the Operations of a Partisan Corps, Called the Queen’s Rangers, Commanded by Lieut. Col. J. G. Simcoe, during the War of the American Revolution . . .. 1844. Reprint. New York, 1968. description ends 128).

4. This sentence does not appear on the copy sent to Huntington. GW corrected this omission in a brief note sent the same day (see the source note to GW to Huntington, 18 Jan. [second letter]). Maj. Carl Leopold Baurmeister, aide-de-camp to Knyphausen, reported that the Americans left “twenty stragglers and as many deserters” behind on the island (Baurmeister, Revolution in America, description begins Carl Leopold Baurmeister. Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals, 1776–1784, of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces. Translated and annotated by Bernhard A. Uhlendorf. New Brunswick, N.J., 1957. description ends 338). Simcoe claimed that the Americans lost “many men by desertion, and many British soldiers, who had enlisted with them to free themselves from imprisonment, embraced the opportunity of being in a country they were acquainted with, to return to their old companions. The Queen’s Rangers obtained a great many recruits” (Simcoe, Operations of the Queen’s Rangers, description begins John Graves Simcoe. Simcoe’s Military Journal: A History of the Operations of a Partisan Corps, Called the Queen’s Rangers, Commanded by Lieut. Col. J. G. Simcoe, during the War of the American Revolution . . .. 1844. Reprint. New York, 1968. description ends 128).

5. Loyalist and militia cavalry officer Isaac Decker later filed a memorial with the British government stating that Stirling’s soldiers had burned the rigging of his sloop, plundered his house, stripped his wife of her clothes, taken all his crops, and burned his fences (Coldham, American Loyalist Claims, description begins Peter Wilson Coldham. American Loyalist Claims. Washington, D.C., 1980. description ends 120).

6. Stirling’s order, signed by his aide-de-camp William Barber and dated this date at Elizabeth, N.J., reads: “By an order of the 14th instant, all officers, soldiers, militia men, and followers of the army, were positively prohibited from plundering or insulting the inhabitants of Staten-Island; notwithstanding which many of the inhabitants of this State took the advantage of the opportunity, while the army kept the enemy within their works, and acted in open violation thereof; Major General Lord Stirling therefore positively requires, that all persons possessed of any articles of plunder, taken on the Island, do immediately deliver the same to Doctor Caldwell, at Springfield, to the end that they may be returned to the proper owners, otherwise they will be proceeded against with military severity.—The very few of the soldiery who were guilty of the same misconduct have been already compelled to restore what they had taken, and will be most severely punished. All the good people of this state who know any persons within the above description, are desired to give immediate information thereof.

“The Major General thanks the officers and men for the good disposition shewn in this excursion; particularly for the good order so conspicuous on retiring from the Island; he is only sorry circumstances did not permit him to avail himself more effectually of their services” (New-Jersey Journal [Chatham], 18 Jan.). For James Caldwell’s efforts to have this plunder returned, see Caldwell to GW, 19 Jan.; see also GW to Caldwell, 21 Jan., and GW to Moses Hazen, 21 Jan. (second letter).

7. Hamilton wrote this paragraph after the closing and Stirling’s signature and marked it for inclusion at this point.

8. On 15 Jan., Brig. Gen. Thomas Stirling wrote to Knyphausen with his account of his opposition to the American expedition. Brigadier Stirling explained that “Being informed at half an hour after seven in the morning by Lieut.-Colonel Buskirk that the enemy had crossed upon the ice from Elizabeth Town with artillery and that he had abandoned Deckers House in consequence of orders I had previously given him if they came with cannon, it not being tenable, and that he was retiring slowly towards the redoubts, I immediately ordered 300 men with 2 three-pounders to occupy the heights on our right in front of the redoubts, and repaired myself there to reconnoitre the enemy, ordering at same time 20 light dragoons to observe their motions. On their approach the rebels fired three shot from two field-pieces planted behind Deckers House. I observed them advancing in two columns, one towards the Clove by Housmans, the other by Deckers near Freshwater Pond, the two columns coming nearly at same time on each side of the pond and took possession of the woody heights in front of the centre and left-had redoubts and extending all along them to near the mouth of the Clove, while another body of them, about 600 men with 2 field-pieces, was sent to mask the troops at the flagstaff and the road to Richmond, and a body of 200 formed in front upon our right. Finding my numbers not sufficient to meet them on the field, I was forced to content myself with occupying the grounds near to and in front of the redoubts and making the best disposition I could to receive them should they offer to attack us. An armed brig which lay off the watering place was of essential service to us in covering our left flank and protecting our hay and wood magazines. About 12 o’clock the rebels began to light fires and continued in that position the whole evening and night without any alteration or attempt upon any of our advanced parties. A little after daybreak I was informed a column of the enemy was advancing on our right; upon viewing them I found it consisted of about 150 men, who upon the approach of a small party I carried with me began to retire, and in half an hour after the enemy were discovered going off by Deckers Ferry. A party of 200 men were ordered immediately to follow them and 20 light dragoons. Lieutenant Stewart of the provincial light horse who commanded them and Cornet Tucker of the 17th [Light Dragoons] made a gallant charge on their rear and took a serjeant and four men prisoners, but our foot not being able to keep pace with them nothing more could be done, the rebels having broke up the bridge at Deckers Mills so soon as they crossed, and by ten this morning were all off the island. They burnt Deckers House and five woodboats that lay on the ice. We have taken a serjeant and sixteen men prisoners; by them I learn great numbers of the rebels were frostbit and sent off during the night in sleighs” (Davies, Documents of the American Revolution, description begins K. G. Davies, ed. Documents of the American Revolution, 1770–1783; (Colonial Office Series). 21 vols. Shannon and Dublin, 1972–81. description ends 18:34–35).

Simcoe, who believed that the time for the attack had been “well chosen” by the American generals, later wrote that Major General Stirling’s march to the Watering Place “cut off General [Thomas] Stirling’s communication with the Volunteers of Ireland [stationed at the Flagstaff] and the Queen’s Rangers [at Richmond]. Lt. Col. Simcoe occupied the high grounds near Richmond with small parties of cavalry, and the infantry were sedulously employed in what might strengthen that post. … all the cattle in the neighbourhood were brought into the precincts of the garrison, as were the sledges, harness and horses, and the most cheerful and determined appearance of resolution ran through the whole corps. About midday, many deserters came in from the rebel army; by them a perfect knowledge of the enemy’s force was gained.” Simcoe intended to launch an attack on Major General Stirling’s rear but was unable to prevail upon the Staten Island Loyalist militia to take the place of the Rangers in the Richmond redoubts. Upon learning of the retreat of Major General Stirling’s battalions, Simcoe “immediately pursued them with the flank companies and Huzzars; and was overtaken by an order from General [Thomas] Stirling to effect the same purpose; but the enemy had passed to the Jersey shore before he could come up with them. While the troops in the enemy’s front, on their arrival at the heights opposite to the British redoubts [at the Watering Place], halted for the rear to close up, they were permitted to make fires, which increased the power of the frost, and rendered them totally unable to proceed, and the severity of the night affecting the whole of them, many lost their limbs, and several their lives.” Simcoe asserted that the “vast mounds of snow drifted before the redoubts” deterred Major General Stirling from attacking at the Watering Place (Simcoe, Operations of the Queen’s Rangers, description begins John Graves Simcoe. Simcoe’s Military Journal: A History of the Operations of a Partisan Corps, Called the Queen’s Rangers, Commanded by Lieut. Col. J. G. Simcoe, during the War of the American Revolution . . .. 1844. Reprint. New York, 1968. description ends 121–28; see also Baurmeister, Revolution in America, description begins Carl Leopold Baurmeister. Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals, 1776–1784, of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces. Translated and annotated by Bernhard A. Uhlendorf. New Brunswick, N.J., 1957. description ends 338).