Hendrik Calkoen to John Adams: A Translation, 31 August 1780
Hendrik Calkoen to John Adams: A Translation
I am Sorry that the time does not permit my reflecting any longer, upon the Subject in question, you will therefore be so kind as to content your self with those few remarks, so as they may arise in my thoughts, which will perhaps cause the one or other recollection to appear, that ought to have been placed something Sooner.
To encourage and Establish as much as possible the general credit of the United States of North America here in Holland, would be above all things necessary an exact authentic and True information of the present Situation of her affairs, accompanied by a previous, Short, tho real account of their course, before during and after the commencement of the troubles, till this day; Where with if it was necessary, to be provided with the genuine Documents and demonstrations. One might be able to resume it in a letter to the Right Honourable G. Germain, to expose <by that means> his ridiculous or improbable Vantises1 presented in the House of Parliament,2 concerning the appraching reconciliation with America, by composing the same further, in an ironical tone, that it might be that means pass the more thro Every bodies hands. But of this present state of affairs, might one further foresee, what the natural consequence of this War must be, because one can judge with more probability of the presumtive issue of affairs; by comparing them with any other event of the like that has happened. Would not a Just and fitted comparison and parallel of the situation of affairs, so as they were at our Revolution, with those of North America be of very great effect, and produce some new observations of consequence, because I am better informed of our war before its independency and adherency, I shall therefore inform you of it, as likewise confirm my abovementioned remarks, by the following Scetch Viz:3
Our Revolution must not pass as one continual Revolution, but as two different ones, yes perhaps three, considered as deriving from each other. The first under the conduct of the Nobility, delivering the known Petition,4 commencing at the same time mutual engagements, which were miscarried intirely, tho the Prince of Orange5 in the Counsel of the party in Suffrance, that is of the opposition, had made up and advanced secretly this League; the reason was that the Commonalty becoming bold upon this convention, Esteemed themselves properly fortifyed, went furiously at Work Beeldstorming6 plundering, depriving the Churches and other Sanctuaries of their Ornaments, throughout the whole Country, by which means the designs of the prudent and well meaning Native Politicians were intirely frustrated, the apprehention with reason of the Roman Catholic Nobility, that the intire abolishment of their Religion was aimed at, induced them to Seperate from the league, that they had already Signed, and returned to the Court party, which they with much facility gained, because it was thought, so as it in reality was, that by means of this division, the whole convention would be torn; it likewise happened too, thro the Italian Policy of the Governess Margaretha7 and her Counselors; Everything disposing itself for Submittance and that without a foreign Soldier in the Country, nor the least require made for any, indeed so far to the contrary, that Margaretha wrote to Spain and could write with truth, “that the Rebellion was Stopt and that every thing was preparing with Speed for Subjection.”
Had the King but then put aside his resolution of sending an Army, with Duke d’Alba8 at the head, the Netherlands would be still in Slavery, yes even if he had judged proper to have left Orange, Egmond, and Hoorn unmolested,9 likely should the same have happened, because the Prince of Orange would then by all probability not have mentained the affair any longer, but the King preversly comprehending, that the occasion was now too fair to invest himself with an unlimitted Sovereignty, Sends Duke d’Alba hither at the head of a mighty Army, and attacks the abovementioned Ringleaders of the opposition, in person, goods and honour, depriving them of their lives and by making himself master at the same time, of the Whole Country, frontiers &c.
The Prince of Orange meeting with such barbarious treatment, brought him to dispair, took recourse to Arms, and came off in the year 1568 with an Army, that he could perform nothing with, even of such little consequence, that it, thro want of pay, diminished of its own self.
Duke d’Alba was, and continued by that means master of all, the Inhabitants with Repugnancy to their inclination of Courage, found themselves under the necessity of submitting intirely. Had he then even with a little Soldiers moderation gouverned the affairs, the Second extinguished Rebellion, would never have dared, to have raised its head again, but, thro violence, fire and Sword, would he cement his Sovereignty, which occasioned the accidental, and intire unadvised Assault and conquest of the Briel,10 executed by a few desperate Netherlanders; That stroke induced mostly, the two Provinces, Holland and Zeeland to rise against him; it gave at last the Prince of Orange an oppertunity, of Setting his feet in this Country again, from where he had been banished for Severall Years. The revolt, of one Town after the other, occasioned by this unexpected event, puzled Duke d’Alba vastly, which place to attack first, and extinguish by that means, the flames that were increasing with great rapidity. His Supiriority during the Year 1573 and 74, favoured him in recovering Severall advantages. He conquerd anew Several of the revolted Towns, and every thing would have been forced a third time, to Submission; above all under the Government of his Successor Requesens,11 who, with much more temperament, went to work, and who would without the least doubt, have rendered the Court Victorious, had he not most unexpectedly died, even without Establishing any form of Gouvernment, or having Chosen a Successor ad interim.
The Counselors of State were naturally obliged, by provision to invest themselves, with the Gouvernment of affairs. The Netherlanders having the Tiller in their hands, and as averse as ever of a foreign Yoke, made a very dextrous use of this opportunity; by imprisoning the Counselors of the Spanish party, whilst the unpaid Spanish Soldiers were revolting, which ended with plundering and Prey of friend and Enemy; All the Provinces that were till thus far with Spain in War, against Holland and Sealand, united to defend the Mother Country against all foreign forces and importunitys.
The Prince of Orange was ordered to Braband, the famious Paciffication of Gend12 was established in a short time after, in a proper Situation, by which means not only the peace with Holland and Sealand was concluded, but likewise a Convention, to remain as formerly, under the King’s authority, and to join each other in Expelling any foreign forces that might attempt returning into this Country.
Holland and Sealand in the mean While recovering their former Strenght, and Spain obtaining from day to day more and more Enemies, gave the affairs here a favourable appearance, tho they remained in an unstable Situation. Difference of Religion, Ambition of a few Dutch Noblemen, with Jealousy seeing, that the Prince of Orange was daily increasing in the Esteem of the Commonalty, the furious Zeal of the Clergymen; those and many other casualties rendered the Situation of affairs, of a very long uncertainty; Small events for and against the cause, were accompanied by important consequences. The Prince of Orange remarking by all those difficulties, that it was impossible to draw all the Provinces under one line, occupied himself by times in concluding a new Union at Utrecht,13to prevent by that means the Submission of a party of Netherlanders that might incline to it; If even the evil that, that Skilful man foresaw, had instantly brooken out.
One might make an end of the comparison at this period, with the only exception, of the unexpected assassination of William 1st.14 in midst of the Netherlands decaying situation of affairs, deprived them intirely of their greatest Support; but neither this change, the Youth of Maurits,15 nor the Confusion that Leicester16 kindled, could give an officer by name, of Parma,17 the least occasion to Subject the Netherlands again, so as has appeared by the course of affairs. In the meanwhile the principallest decision of the War has been at Sea, executing from time to time audacious and fortunate expeditions at Sea, by which it seems alone that Netherland has had more advantages in, than America; The Spanyards Supiriority at Sea, by comparing the same with ours at that time, is much the same, as that of England is at present, with America.
Out of this short Schetch of the Situation of affairs, which resemble much each other in all particularities; but to return to the affairs again, there can be more than one remark drawn from them, that can be of service to the one in question. The great difference between us and America is very evident, as likewise are the great advantages in general that has been perceived there during this War. For America must be Conquered yet, and then afterwards preserved. Suppose England was to become Master of it, then England shall begin first where Spain began, the trouble of preservation shall than (all other considerations layed aside) be so much the greater, as the land it self is in proportion, much larger than our little Country. Has now Spain, with a Strong army in this Country, in total possession of the whole, as likewise of the frontiers, Ammunition, financies and God knows what more? Has Spain, that proportion to Netherlands at least, Mightyer, than what England is with regard to America, the same Netherlands were at that time devided into different sorts of animosities, tho withall that, they have not been able to preserve them, the hatred that the Nation had against Spanyards or a Spanish name. Expelled them all. Need one therefore be cautious in foretelling also, that if even America was once to be intirely conquered, and forced to Submit, its preservation and Salvation, would be imperformable for Engeland, with her exausted forces.
This argument, this comparison and parallel well effected in all its particularities by a Skilfull hand, would be a strong argument both for Skilful and unskilful people. To urge it, one would be under the necessity of making use partly or totally, of the following <questions> things.
1. To prove with Speaking facts that an implacable hatred and aversion reigns throughout America.
2. That this general is, or at least so general, that the Tories are in so Small a number, and of such little force, that they are counted as nothing.
3. That America, not withstanding the War, daily increases in Strenght and force.
4. Whether America then in or of itself thro means of purchaseing or exchanging the productions from their respective Provinces, would be able to continue the war for at least 6, 8 or 10 Years, even if they were intirely deprived of the trade with Europe, or their Allies Exausted by the war, and forced to make a Separate peace, were to leave them.
5. That there is no voluntary revolt of one or more of the Provinces to be apprehended, and if even it was to happen, of one, or more, Whether the others would not be able to defend themselves.
6. That no Person in America is of so much influence, power, or credit, that his death, or thro corruption of English money, could be of any nameable consequence.
7. That the Commonalty in America are not inclined, nor would be able to find Sufficient fundaments to frustrate by force the good intentions of the Skilful Politicians, even as the Beeldenstorm did, notwithstanding all the wise measures, that the Prince of Orange had taken.
8. What England properly ought to do, to force America to Submittance, and preserve her in the Same, what should be required to do it? How much time, money and Vessels, would be wanted for that purpose?
(N.B. One comprehends, that this must only be performed, by reserving the essential Secrets of State; which remark is here once for all explained.)
Out of this might, and must be proved the imperformable view of England.
9. How strong the English land force is, that actually carry Arms against America? How strong it was at the beginning of those troubles? Whether the Same is in an increasing, or always diminishing Situation?
10. How great the Effective force of America is, that’s in opposition to it, as well relative to the number of men, as their discipline, from the Commencement of the troubles, till thus far? Is there a good Supply of Warlike Stores, are they to be found partly or intirely in America, or must they be imported?
11. How great is the present debt of America? What has she yearly use of to act defensively, are those wants Supplied by the inhabitants themselves or by other Nations? If in the latter case, what does America loose of her Strenght by it? are they not in one manner or the other recompenced again by some other equivalent advantage? If so, thro which? What would be required to act offencively, and by that means shorten the War?
12. What countenance has the Situation of the financies? how much does the expences excel the Yearly income? does the annual Revenue, deriving from the Taxes, increase or diminish? over the whole or in some particularities, which are the reasons to be given for it?
13. Of What resources might America hereafter, Still make use of?
14. What is the quantity of the made, and in circulation Paper Money? What Credit the inhabitants have for it in their daily business? What designes they have by maintaining its Credit, by preventing as much as possible its increase and in what manner theyll realize it?
15. Does not the English army itself, thats in America, lay out its pay, or at least the greatest part; must in spite of England cause a great circulation of effective money? If so, at how much can the yearly benefit, be calculated at? Are not the greatest part of the mutual Prisoner found for in America? Who is it that has the care of their maintainance? The Power, that they have Served, or well that one, Who made them Prisoners? If it is the Power that they have served, the question is, whether America then Supplies them with money, or does it by furnishing them with provisions and other necessaries? How does that happen with regard to Bourgoyn’s Army? If they buy and pay the Commodities they are in want of with effective money, great quantities of Gold and Silver must by that Means circulate among the Americans, and also fulfill Vastly their urging want of Money—pray whats your opinion of this reflection?
16. Who looses the most by desertion, America or England? Do the English deserters serve voluntarily and well in the American army? Upon what footing can they, who do not enter into the Army, Subsist? how great is their number? do they Suffer under any difficulties of want, or can they properly Subsist?
17. Have they any informations, that one can rely upon concerning the Population? does it increase or diminish? or is it almost in the same Situation, as it was, at the beginning of the War?
18. Does Sufficiant tranquility, contentment, and prosperity reign in those places where the rage of War is not effectual? can one Sufficiantly Subsist there, without feeling the oppression of the Taxes? does plenty abound there, that is, more than is needful, and are the People well affected and encouraged to persue the war and endure its calamities, or is there poverty and dejection?
19. Is not Peace very much longed for in America, might not that perhaps give some inducement of hearckning to proposals appearing very fair (but which are in reality to the contrary) which one might be too quick in listning too, and forced to accept?
20. Has there not been different opinions in Congress with regard to this, and from which animosities have arisen?
21. Are there no Malcontents in America, over the public government, tho much inclined otherways for the American cause, who might force the Nation or Congress against their Resolutions and interests to conclude a Peace?
22. General Monk18 repaired the Kings government, in England, might not one American General or the other, be able, by way of discontent, or drawn thro Corruption, to perform the Same? Should the Army follow his orders on such an occasion?
23. Should one or more Politicians thro Intrigues, undertake the same, with any hopes of Success, should even the Army assist him in Such a case?
24. The new arisen Revolution must certainly have made a great change in the affairs, and even so, that a vast many people, tho at present free of the Enemies incursions, have with all that lost their daily Subsistance; are the occupations which came instead of their old ones, been till thus far Sufficient to Supply their want? and are the affairs already to that respect brought upon a new durable footing, that no Want or poverty of consequence can be Suffered on that account alone?
25. Do they, who have lost their possessions and fortunes by the War, endure the same in general patiently as compatriots, in so far that nothing can be feared of them?
26. How has it gone with the Cultivation of the land, before the troubles, at their Commencement, and at present? What change of increase or diminish have those places undergone where the War has not in long raged?
27. How was the Situation of Manufactures, manual art, and trade in general at the beginning of this War, what change of increase or diminish have they met with, during the Same?
28. Has America gained or lost, by the mutual capture of Ships? how much is the benefit or prejudice of it, by calculation?
29. Which are the veritable damages Sustained, or Still to be Suffered, by the loss of Charlestown, and what influence the same has had over the minds in general?
See there Dear Sir, my thoughts over the Subject, in some degrees circumstantially proposed.
I conceive very clear, that all the made questions, cannot nor must not be publicly answered. Also is the one of more consequence then the other, the positive proof of these and other affairs, shall above all in Severall cases fall very difficult, yes often be impossible, but one can then take for assistance and relief a Negative demonstration, by Example Article 14 concerning the Paper money, its miscredit is perhaps if I may Judge, without having a local knowledge of it, the principal inability of America. If no Satisfactory Solution could be given of it, the inquest must be turned negatively in an inquiry of the English financies prescribing their depretiated Situation, for which purpose one must above all things make use of Humes19 remarks concerning their public debt, which would at the same time be a feeling pinch for their Credit. While Hume has made such dreadful fear exciting predictions about it, that at a Simple lecture of his remarks, one feels a remarkable perturbation, even if one has none, or but very little concern in their funds.
I Humbly beg youll be mindfull in procuring me the lecture of the Original Act of Independency, because I am from day to day more and more persuaded, that the English Newspapers are also deceived, and that I have likewise read a Counterfeited peace.
I am therefore very desirous to read with attention, a real peace of so much consequence.
In the mean while I have the honour to remain with much Esteem.
RC (Adams Papers). Translation in Herman Le Roy’s hand (Adams Papers); endorsed: “Mr Calkoens Questions.” Herman Le Roy, son of the Rotterdam merchant Jacob Le Roy, was born in America, but since the early 1770s had lived in Amsterdam. Returning to America in 1782, he became a leading New York merchant. For an account of Le Roy and the relations between his family and the Adamses, see , 4:148. For a discussion of Calkoen’s letter and JA’s response to the questions posed by the Dutch lawyer, see Replies to Hendrik Calkoen, 4–27 Oct., Editorial Note (below).
1. The editors do not know the meaning of this word.
2. Calkoen is probably referring to Germain’s speech of 5 May, to which JA had replied in a letter of [28 May] to Edmé Jacques Genet (above). For the publication of JA’s response in both France and England, see the letter to Genet, note 1, and Edmund Jenings’ letter of 9 July, and note 2 (above).
3. What follows is a rambling, but generally accurate, account of the late sixteenth-century revolt by the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands against Spanish rule. The ten southern or Catholic provinces, now forming parts of France and the nations of Luxembourg and Belgium, ultimately returned to the Spanish fold, but the seven northern or Calvinist provinces combined to form the Dutch Republic, and it is with these that Calkoen is most concerned. Although he notes the assassination of William I, Prince of Orange, in 1584 and the later intervention by Elizabeth I of England, Calkoen’s narrative centers on the years 1566 to 1579. It opens with the petition, known as the “Request,” presented to Margaret, Duchess of Parma and Governess General of the Netherlands, on 5 April 1566 and ends with the Union of Utrecht of 23 Jan. 1579, by which the seven northern provinces agreed to act as a single political entity.
As Calkoen indicates, the Dutch Revolt really comprised three separate uprisings. The first, spanning the years 1565 to 1568, was against the Spanish monarch Philip II’s efforts to enhance his ability to govern the Netherlands by reducing the rights and privileges of the provinces, towns, and nobles and imposing the Inquisition. It failed because of the religious divisions within the ranks of the rebels and William I’s inability to create an effective military force to defeat the forces of the Duke of Alva. The second revolt raged from 1569 to 1576 and was directed against the despotism of the Duke of Alva and, in particular, his effort to raise revenue by imposing a 10 percent value added tax. This uprising, like the first, was hampered by divisions within the rebel forces and the strength of Alva’s army, but a base of operations within the northern provinces was established when the rebels captured the port of Brielle in 1572. The third revolt lasted from 1576 to 1581 and was fought, at least by the northern provinces, to establish a national state and ended when the United Provinces formally declared their independence from Spain. The war with Spain, as opposed to the Revolt, however, did not end in 1581. Fighting continued until the Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609, was resumed in 1621, and ended only in 1648 with the Peace of Munster. Only then, over eighty years after the Dutch had first taken up arms, was Dutch independence finally and formally established.
Because Calkoen’s history of the Dutch Revolt is reliable, annotation has been limited to brief identifications of major figures and events. Perhaps the best modern account is Geoffrey , rev. edn., N.Y., 1985. See also Charles Wilson, The Transformation of Europe, 1558–1648, Berkeley, 1976, which stresses the revolt’s European context and argues that efforts to suppress it destroyed Spain as a major power; and Herbert H. Rowen, The Princes of Orange: The Stadholders in the Dutch Republic, Cambridge, Eng., 1988, which contains an excellent short biography of William I, Prince of Orange, and examines the development of the stadholder system.
4. This petition, known as the “Request,” was presented on 5 April 1566 by 300 armed nobles who forced their way into the presence of Margaret, Duchess of Parma, the Governess General of the Netherlands and half-sister of Philip II. She was to inform Philip of the Dutch opposition to the Inquisition and request its retraction and, in the meantime, was to suspend its operation. Lacking the power to resist the nobles effectively, Margaret replied on 9 April with a proposal known as the “Moderation.” Noting her inability to act without specific instructions from Madrid, she nonetheless agreed to suspend the prosecution of heretics while awaiting new instructions. The “Request” and the resulting “Moderation” undermined Margaret’s authority and diminished what little ability she had to control events. Dutch hopes were raised, but Philip was unwilling to make the concessions, thus making new challenges a certainty (, p. 69–72).
5. William I, Prince of Orange (William the Silent), was a leader of the Dutch nobility in 1565 and became the driving force behind the Dutch Revolt until his assassination in 1584. Although he proved unequal to the task of uniting all seventeen provinces, he never lost confidence in a final victory over Spain (, p. 8–31).
6. That is, iconoclasm or the breaking of images. Inspired by itinerant Calvinist preachers and encouraged by the “Moderation” of April, the iconoclasts began their work in Steenvoord, Flanders, in August, and by mid-September churches had been sacked as far north as Groningen. Local authorities were unable or unwilling to maintain order and Margaret at first lacked the means to compel obedience to the central government. The iconoclasm was one of the major factors in Philip’s decision to send a Spanish army under the Duke of Alva to restore order (, p. 74–84).
7. Margaret, Duchess of Parma, who was replaced as Governess General by the Duke of Alva in 1567 (same, p. 44, 106).
8. In the spring of 1567, Philip II dispatched an army under Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alva, to restore royal authority. Alva reached the Netherlands in August and immediately established Spanish garrisons in Brussels and surrounding towns. Then, by means of the “Council of Troubles” or, as referred to by the Dutch, the “Council of Blood,” he began the wholesale condemnation and execution of heretics and opponents of Spanish rule. He served until 1573 (same, p. 99–117). “Alva” became a synonym for tyrant, as can be seen from JA’s 1774 use of “Alva Gage” to describe Thomas Gage, last royal governor of Massachusetts (vol. 2:206, but see also 2:232 and 7:58, 235).
9. Lamoral, Count of Egmont, and Philip de Montmorency, Count of Hornes, leaders of the Dutch opposition, who had imprudently placed themselves within reach of the Duke of Alva, were executed in the great square at Brussels on 5 June 1568. This despite Egmont’s distinguished military record in the Spanish service and the fact that both men were Catholics who never irrevocably broke with Philip II. William of Orange, unwilling to test Alva’s benevolence, went into exile in his German possessions and was condemned in absentia, his property confiscated, and his son, Philip William, Count of Buren, seized and sent to Spain (, p. 50–52, 106, 108, 110).
10. This is the capture, in April 1572, of Brielle, Zeeland, by the “Sea Beggars,” essentially pirates operating under letters of marque from William and preying on the towns and commerce along the Dutch coast. It established what had been lacking before, a permanent base of operations for the forces loyal to William I (same, p. 131–134).
11. On 29 Nov. 1573, Don Luis de Requesens, governor of Lombardy, was sworn in as the Duke of Alva’s replacement. Requesens maintained military pressure on the rebels, but, unlike Alva, was willing to negotiate with William’s representatives. His death in March 1576 ended the possibility of a settlement, but the lack of a successor created a power vacuum that the Dutch rebels were quick to exploit (same, p. 163–171).
12. Signed on 8 Nov. 1576, the Pacification of Ghent ended the second revolt. The agreement between the Prince of Orange and the provinces of Holland and Zeeland as well as the States General representing the other provinces provided for an end to fighting between the provinces and the expulsion of Spanish troops from the Netherlands. When that had been accomplished, a States General of the seventeen provinces united by Charles V in 1548 would meet to settle religious and national issues (same, p. 176–178).
13. The Pacification of Ghent, to which all seventeen Dutch provinces were a party and which included at least a nominal recognition of Spanish rule, reflected William I’s intention to unify the Low Countries, but by 1579 religious differences combined to make a north-south division permanent. On 6 Jan. 1579 the provinces of Hainaut and Artois joined in the Union of Arras and by February were joined by the Walloon provinces. This combination of the southern, Catholic provinces opened negotiations and ultimately was reconciled with Philip II. On 23 Jan. 1579 the northern, Protestant provinces, led by Holland and Zeeland, signed the Union of Utrecht. This agreement provided the territorial and political foundation for the Dutch Republic, and insured that it would continue the struggle against Spain (same, p. 194–195).
14. Spain had long encouraged plots to assassinate William of Orange, but none were successful until 10 July 1584, when a young Catholic zealot, Balthazar Gérard, shot William twice at his Delft residence (same, p. 207; , p. 30).
15. This is Maurice of Nassau, son of William of Orange, who was sixteen years old when his father died. By 1589, Maurice was Stadholder of five provinces and commander of the United Provinces’ southern military forces. It was in his military rather than his political capacity that he had the most impact. Maurice was a gifted commander and it was largely through his efforts that the United Provinces were cleared of Spanish forces and the Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609, which he personally opposed, was made possible (, p. 32–55).
16. Foreign assistance had long been seen as necessary in the struggle against Spain. After William’s death, the States General approached both France and England. France refused, but Elizabeth I agreed to send an army commanded by Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester. Leicester landed at Flushing in Dec. 1585 and was appointed governor general of the United Provinces. His administrative and military incompetence, however, soon made him unpopular and brought little change in the Dutch situation vis-à-vis Spain. Leicester’s accomplishments were few, but by the time of his recall in 1587 Dutch independence was fully established (same, p. 34–36; , p. 216–221).
17. This was Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma, son of the former governess general. Parma served as governor from 1578 to his death in 1592 and was the architect of the Union of Arras. A skilled military leader, he might well have reconquered the northern provinces, at least to Holland’s border, had he not been sent to France in 1590 to oppose Henry of Navarre, or had he received adequate support from Philip II (, p. 193–195, 208–216, 221–230).
18. George Monck, 1st duke of Albemarle, had a long and distinguished military career. He began in the service of Charles I, but later served Oliver Cromwell, whom he greatly admired. Upon Cromwell’s death, however, Monck became convinced that the nation’s welfare demanded that the monarchy be reestablished and he became a principle instrument for the restoration of Charles II in 1660 ().
19. Probably a reference to David Hume’s Political Discourses, Edinburgh, 1752, which had considerable influence on Adam Smith. The volume included essays on a variety of economic topics, including “Of Public Credit.”