John Jay’s elevation to the presidency of Congress came as a direct result of the factional split between the supporters of Silas Deane and the partisans of Arthur Lee.

The dispatching by Congress of Silas Deane to Paris in 1776 as a commissioner to obtain secret aid for the American cause laid the foundations for a controversy that spawned factions in Congress and left a heritage of personal animosities. Deane obtained aid from France and Spain, using the services of Caron de Beaumarchais, who in turn formed Roderigue Hortalez & Cie., through which supplies to America could pass without embarrassing the French government. Arthur Lee of Virginia, ever suspicious and quarrelsome, joined Deane and Franklin as a commissioner in December 1776. Doubting Deane’s rectitude, Lee insisted that the supplies that Deane secured in France were a gift from the French government and that Deane and Beaumarchais were planning to line their own pockets with the funds Congress would vote them. Lee sent his accusations to Congress, which recalled Deane in July 1778 and requested him to render “a general account of his whole transactions in France.”1

Deane eventually responded by publishing a letter in the Pennsylvania Packet on 5 December 1778, entitled “To the Free and Virtuous Citizens of America,” in which he denounced Lee and accused Congress of neglect and ignorance of foreign affairs.2 This dispute divided Congress into pro- and anti-Deane factions while further adding to the breach between Yankee and Yorker. Henry Laurens (1724–92) of South Carolina, an ally of the Lees and president of Congress at the start of the dispute, considering Congress’s response to Deane’s insults inadequate, felt impelled to resign on 9 December 1778.3 Jay, who was thought to be strongly pro-French, was elected to succeed him the following morning. As James Duane informed George Clinton on 10 December, “A great majority of Congress immediately determined that one of the New York Delegates should succeed to the Chair.” The New York delegates in attendance proposed Philip Schuyler, a motion that Duane reported seemed “very agreeable,” but since Schuyler was not then attending Congress, Jay, who expected his congressional term to be brief, “was prevailed on to take the chair with a resolution on his part to resign in favor of General Schuyler as soon as he attends.” However, since Schuyler did not attend Congress until November 1779 and the New York legislature continued to extend Jay’s period of service in Congress, Jay remained president until he was elected minister to Spain in September 1779.4

Jay’s reputation for ability was, of course, also an important factor in his selection.5 “The weight of his personal Character,” Gouverneur Morris wrote to George Clinton on the day of the election, “contributed as much to his Election as the Respect for the State which hath done and suffered so much or the Regard for its Delegates which is not inconsiderable.”6 Conrad Alexandre Gérard, the French minister in Philadelphia, reported various other reasons for Jay’s election: he was a man of talents, well versed in the present state of affairs; he possessed an independent fortune; he was a new member not yet pledged to either of the parties that divided Congress; and because he was considered one of the best orators in America, those who feared his opposition wanted him in the president’s chair, since presidents, who were supposed to be impartial, rarely participated in the debates.7

In the contests that followed his election, Jay and his allies, including Morris, sided with Deane, though Jay’s position sometimes deterred him from actively supporting pro-Deane measures in Congress.8 Jay’s brother Sir James became a tool of the Lee faction during the early maneuvers in Congress, and despite warnings from Gouverneur Morris of Lee’s earlier statements questioning his loyalty, Sir James remained staunchly anti-Deane.9

The Lee-Deane dispute spawned an ugly incident with international overtones. Almost the first order of business facing John Jay as president of Congress was the investigation into the behavior of the secretary to the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Thomas Paine. Incensed by Silas Deane’s defense of Beaumarchais, Paine supported Arthur Lee’s position that the contract Deane made with Beaumarchais for supplies was a gift and not entitled to reimbursement. In his enthusiastic defense of Lee and attack on Deane, Paine was so indiscreet as to disclose secret information about French aid to the United States prior to the alliance of 1778.10

Even though France had been at war with England for almost a year, it considered Paine’s revelation an embarrassment to France and a reflection on its king’s honor, because Louis XVI and the French ministry had repeatedly denied to Britain that such aid had been given. When Paine refused to retract, Gérard officially protested to Congress, insisting that Paine be disciplined and that Congress repudiate his statement.11

On 6 January 1779 Paine was called to the bar of the House and questioned by President Jay.12 Subsequently, Congress began to debate and amend a disciplinary resolution and passed one dismissing Paine from office. He anticipated the move by resigning his post.13 No easy man to silence, Paine continued both publicly and privately to defend his having leaked state secrets. On 14 September 1779 he published a letter in the Pennsylvania Packet, addressed to “Messrs. Deane, Jay, and Gerard,” in which he characterized Jay as having been a lukewarm Patriot and attacked him for denying the truth about French aid to the Americans.14

During the period of somewhat over nine months in which Jay served as president of the Continental Congress, a host of critical problems confronted the Congress for resolution—constitutional, fiscal, military, and diplomatic. While lacking the executive powers exercised by the president under the later federal Constitution, the president not only presided over Congress but also exercised his vote as a delegate, received and replied to correspondence addressed to him in his formal capacity, signed congressional resolutions, drafted a number of them himself, and played a not inconsiderable role behind the scenes in the delicate negotiations then being conducted with France’s minister to the United States, Conrad Alexander Gérard, to settle on peace terms.

On 6 January 1779, Maryland formally refused to join the Confederation unless all states with western lands ceded their claims to Congress, thereby continuing what in effect was a constitutional crisis. Arguing that the war constituted a common effort for a common cause, “landless” states like Maryland had demanded equal opportunity to settle the western lands, while recognizing that without the support of Congress they would not achieve that objective. Although “landless” states took a high ground, numerous speculators in Pennsylvania and Maryland with stock in various land companies stood to lose heavily if the landed states succeeded in having their titles recognized.15

The Articles of Confederation, in the final draft adopted by Congress 15 November 1777, required the approval of the legislatures of “all the United States” to “become conclusive.” After most of the states had ratified, in May 1779 Virginia urged that all the states authorize their delegates to ratify by a certain date, at which time the articles would be binding on them only. It further suggested that Congress allow the remaining states to join by either a “given or indefinite” future time. Virginia’s proposal was not adopted, however, and Maryland continued to refuse to ratify.16

A Continentalist like Jay, who as chief justice of the United States would later express the view that the union was formed by the people rather than the states, seemed inclined to the opinion that unanimous ratification was not necessary to put the articles into effect. In his “Circular Letter from Congress to Their Constituents” of 13 September 1779 (below), he denied the validity of the argument that “the Confederation of the States remains yet to be perfected; that the Union may be dissolved; Congress be abolished, and each State resuming its delegated powers, proceed in future to hold and exercise all the rights of sovereignty appertaining to an independent state.” Contrariwise, he contended that “for every purpose essential to the defense of these States in the progress of the present war, and necessary to the attainment of the objects of it, these States now are as fully, legally, and absolutely confederated as is possible for them to be.” He rested his authority on the Declaration of Independence assented to by each of the states, while reminding his readers that twelve of the thirteen had already acceded to the “perpetual Confederation.” Nevertheless, Maryland’s recalcitrance held up formal ratification of the articles until 1 March 1781, by which date Jay had already spent over a year in Spain on his special mission.17

Fortunately for the doctrine of national supremacy, Jay was president of Congress at the time of a clash between Congress and Pennsylvania over the appellate jurisdiction in admiralty. The sloop Active had been condemned in the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty in Philadelphia. The Standing Committee of Congress, in defiance of a Pennsylvania statute of the previous year, reexamined the facts and reversed the decree. When the Pennsylvania admiralty court refused to execute this new decree on the ground that a finding by a jury of the facts was conclusive under the statute, a special committee of Congress upheld its own Committee on Appeals and recommended an appropriate resolution in which Jay had a hand and which Congress adopted in March 1779. Therein Congress affirmed the power of such persons as it should appoint to examine decisions of fact as well as law in appeals from state courts of admiralty, decisions both of juries and of judges, and to issue a final decree. Exercising for the first time during the American Revolution the power to declare a state law unconstitutional, Congress resolved “that no act of any one State can or ought to destroy the right of appeals to Congress in the sense above declared.” In Jay’s handwriting and in words assertive of the fundamental tenets of national sovereignty, Congress went on to assert

That Congress is by these United States invested with the supreme sovereign power of war and peace;

That the power of executing the law of nations is essential to the sovereign supreme power of war and peace;

That the legality of all captures on the high seas must be determined by the law of nations.

This is followed, in the hand of Nathaniel Folsom (1726–90) of New Hampshire, by the further assertion that

the authority ultimately and finally to decide on all matters and questions touching the law of nations, does reside and is vested in the sovereign supreme power of war and peace;

That a controul by appeals is necessary, in order to compel a just and uniform execution of the law of nations.

On a roll call only Pennsylvania voted in the negative, and Congress proceeded, after Jay had left the Congress, to confirm its authority by setting up a Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture in January 1781. Two months later, in a sweeping resolution drafted by James Madison, Congress reasserted its authority to seize prizes of the enemy.18

As a New Yorker, Jay sought the aid of the landed states in the renewed conflict between New York and Vermont, which had declared itself a separate state. The secessionist movement caused alarm among many prominent New Yorkers who had speculated extensively in the Vermont lands.

While New York had already turned to the Continental Congress to settle the troublesome issue, as Duane reported in his letter of 22–24 August 1778, above, that body was marking time. To expedite a settlement, Jay, in no small part at Duane’s prompting, was dispatched to Congress. Article 25 of the New York State Constitution authorized the chief justice (as well as other supreme court justices, and the chancellor) to hold the post of delegate to the Congress “upon special occasion” without resigning his judicial post. This provision, which Duane stated was included in the constitution to permit Jay and / or Chancellor Robert R. Livingston to handle the Vermont issue in Congress, cleared the way for Jay’s appointment by the senate and assembly on 4 November 1778; he first attended Congress on 7 December. While the Vermont dispute remained unsettled during Jay’s tenure of the presidency and for years thereafter, he succeeded toward the last weeks of his term in persuading the Congress to adopt a set of resolutions calculated to restrain Vermont until Congress had heard the matters at issue among New York, New Hampshire, and “the people claiming to be the State of Vermont.” It was a resolution he deemed favorable to New York’s prospects.19

On another land controversy, Jay, reflecting the views of Governor George Clinton and other New Yorkers, was prepared to cede his state’s western land claims in order to win the backing of the landless states and their allies in Congress for New York’s side in the dispute with Vermont. However, New York’s authorization to her delegates to cede lands west of a fixed boundary line was largely negotiated by Philip Schuyler, who was sent to Congress as Jay’s replacement in the fall of 1779.20

Exigent military matters claimed much of Congress’s attention and constituted a considerable part of Jay’s correspondence in the presidency. The year 1779 marked a seesaw period in the military fortunes of the republic. It began with the canceling of a Canadian expedition that Lafayette was to have commanded and the substitution later that year of Sullivan’s campaign against the Indians and Loyalists on the New York-Pennsylvania frontier. In the southern states, American military strength rapidly eroded, but in the North, in addition to Sullivan’s reduction of the offensive threat of the Iroquois, victories were achieved at Stony Point and Paulus Hook.

In addition to issues of military strategy, Washington saw fit to call Congress’s attention to the problems of recruitment. Congress then set up a system of bounties as incentives to enlistment or reenlistment, but it refused to adopt Washington’s proposal for pensions of half pay for life to officers who served for the duration of the war. Although some increases in salary for officers were voted on 18 August 1779, Congress evaded the half-pay issue, and its indecisiveness was to plague its relations with the army in the years ahead.21

The “Conway Cabal” appeared to have long since expired, but its ghost still haunted the halls of Congress.22 On 15 March 1779, General Gates wrote President Jay a letter criticizing Washington’s strategy and operations (below). Jay forwarded Washington the relevant extract on 6 April.23 The enclosure elicited from Washington a stout defense of his opposition to the Canadian campaign and a vigorous attack on Gates for the indecency and impropriety of the latter’s observations. Washington’s letter drew a reassuring reply from Jay on 21 April, in which he avowed his unshaken confidence, respect, and affection for the commander in chief (below).

Personality clashes among army medical administrators produced periodic repercussions in Congress, one of which occurred during Jay’s presidency. Dr. William Shippen (1736–1808), who succeeded his fellow Philadelphian Dr. John Morgan as head of the medical service, survived a congressional hearing in 1778 that heard charges of inefficiency brought against him by another prominent Philadelphia physician, Dr. Benjamin Rush (1746–1813). Rush resigned as surgeon general of the Middle Department, but his efforts to discredit Shippen were continued by Morgan, whose letter to Jay accusing the director general of misconduct appears below.

On 10 May 1779, Washington expressed his concern to Jay about “the state of our currency,” warning that “if something effective be not done to restore its credit, it will in a short time either cease to circulate altogether, or circulate so feebly as to be utterly incapable of drawing out the resources of the country.” Indeed, throughout Jay’s presidency, currency depreciation and price inflation proved major concerns and contributed to shortages, to investigations of merchants, military suppliers, and staff officers, and to numerous resignations of public officials—all discussed with some frequency in the letters appearing below. On 13 January 1779, Congress adopted an “Address to the People on the Currency,” in which the issuance of bills of credit was vigorously defended and blame for depreciation attributed to the enemy for widespread counterfeiting operations. On 26 May, Congress adopted another “Address to the Inhabitants of the United States of America,” drafted largely by John Dickinson but substantially revised in Congress and published under Jay’s signature.24 As resentment against speculation reached a fever pitch, Congress felt impelled to try more Spartan methods. On 3 September it placed a ceiling of $200 million on the emission of bills of credit, and five days later it instructed President Jay to send out his “Circular Letter from Congress to Their Constituents” (printed below). In that address, dated 13 September 1779 and bearing the inimitable style associated with Jay,25 the president called on the states to pay their taxes and advocated reducing the amount of currency in circulation and relying henceforth on loans and taxes. As he saw it, the American people had sufficient assets to pay off the national debt in eighteen to twenty years after the war’s end, in no small part due to both the natural increase of population and the prospective tide of immigration. In an eloquent closing passage he proclaimed: “Let it never be said, that America had no sooner become independent than she became insolvent, or that her infant glories and growing fame were obscured and tarnished by broken contracts and violated faith, in the very hour when all the nations of the earth were admiring and almost adoring the splendor of her rising.”

The debate over peace objectives was also a critical issue during Jay’s term as president, one in which personalities and factions complicated the problems of foreign policy. His experience as presiding officer over these stormy arguments prompted Jay to observe to Washington on 26 April (below) that “there is as much intrigue in this State House as in the Vatican, but as little secrecy as in a boarding school.” A more complete description of the debates over peace objectives is found in the editorial note entitled “Congress Appoints John Jay Minister to Spain” on pp. 709–16.