Congress Debates the Commissioners’ Conduct Editorial Note
Congress Debates the Commissioners’ Conduct
The General Washington reached Philadelphia on 12 March with the preliminary articles of peace and the accompanying dispatches, among them Jay’s long letter to the secretary for foreign affairs of 17 November 1782. Captain Barney had sailed from France three days before the general peace had been concluded, thereby removing the commissioners’ substantial achievements from the context in which they could be fully appreciated. Congress was both pleased and deeply troubled when it read and debated the dispatches over the next four days. Many delegates feared that the war might be continued with disastrous consequences for the United States if the alliance had been weakened by French displeasure at the commissioners’ failure to seek and submit to French advice. La Luzerne played heavily on these apprehensions in his meetings with congressional delegates.1
In his notes on the congressional debates and, no doubt, in his conversations with Robert R. Livingston, Madison fixed his attention on “the separate & secret manner in which our Ministers had proceded with respect to France & the confidential manner with respect to the British Ministers.”2 The “more judicious” members of Congress, he commented, thought the American negotiators had been “ensnared by the dexterity of the British Minister, “ and “particularly disapproved of the conduct of Mr. Jay in submitting to the Enemy his jealousy of the French . . . and of the unguarded manner in which he Mr. A. & Dr. F. had given in writing sentiments unfriendly to our Ally.” Some delegates thought the separate article “most offensive,” not because of the territory potentially ceded to Britain, but because it was “inconsistent with the spirit of the Alliance, and a dishonorable departure from the candor rectitude & plain dealing professed by Congs.” Although Madison admitted that the terms the commissioners had obtained “were popular in their nature,” he feared that Britain, by leaking details of the negotiations to the French, could destroy French confidence in the United States, thereby endangering America’s public safety and national honor.
Madison echoed the full range of French complaints about the process. Jay came in for the largest share of the blame. He had, Madison argued, refused to consider France’s “delicate situation between Spain & the U. S.;” and had joined “with the enemy in taking advantage of it to increase her perplexity.” In a letter to Edmund Randolph, written a few days after the dispatches arrived, Madison was even more sharply critical. Britain, he asserted, had decoyed the American commissioners “into a degree of confidence which seems to leave their own reputations as well as the safety of their country at the mercy of Shelburne. In this business Jay has taken the lead & proceeded to a length of which you can form little idea.” Adams, he claimed, had followed willingly. Franklin had been “dragged into it.” Only Laurens had professed “violent suspicion of GB and good will & confidence toward France.”3
Congress’s president, Elias Boudinot, took a more nuanced and favorable view of the commissioners’ proceedings. On 17 March he informed Washington that the preliminaries had arrived. The American ministers, he wrote, had succeeded in obtaining a revision in Oswald’s commission that recognized the independence of the United States. In the negotiations that followed, he said, it “clearly appears from our Ministers Letters that Mr. Oswald acted merely on the principles of a lover of Peace.” He also mentioned Jay’s and Adams’s suspicions of the French: “ it is said by some, that the Court of France took the Alarm at our extensive Claims on every Point, and began to fear lest the policy of England should grant to America too much.” When it appeared that Britain might accept American demands, he remarked, “it is alledged, that she unhappily tarnished her Glory & reputation” by sending Rayneval to England to indicate that France would support British attempts to limit its concessions to the United States. “The british Ministry,” he continued, “instead of indeavouring to reduce the pretensions of America, candidly (in Appearance) communicated this conduct of France to our Commissioners and thereby created a Jealousy in their Minds agt that Court” that Boudinot thought might explain their decision to sign the provisional articles without the knowledge of France. Vergennes, he added, “covered his Chagrin by expressing his astonishment at our having obtained such advantageous Terms.” He credited the American commissioners for maintaining “great Harmony” amongst themselves “thro’out the Business” and then reported that the first installment of a new 6 million livres loan from France had arrived with the provisional articles.4
Livingston’s views closely paralleled Madison’s and bore the imprint of pressure exerted by La Luzerne. On 18 March, considering the matters on which he wished for guidance “of too delicate a nature to be rendered by formal acts,” the Secretary sent Congress a draft of his reply to the commissioners’ letter of 14 Dec. 1782 (above), in which he addressed the points he considered “the most embarrassing as well as the most important.” He noted that, on 4 October 1782, Congress had affirmed that it would consider British peace overtures only “in confidence and in concert” with the French and had directed that this resolution should be sent to La Luzerne and the American commissioners and published “to the world.” He then criticized the commissioners for imagining that they were justified in suspecting the sincerity of France, for failing to inform the French about the preliminary terms they had agreed upon until after they were signed, and for not informing Vergennes about the separate article. Congress, he asserted, must either make itself party to the concealment and thereby contradict its previous public professions of confidence in France or, by revealing it, destroy the confidence between its commissioners and the French court at a time when the commissioners had obtained “such terms . . . as does great honor to them, and at least equals our highest expectations.”5
Livingston did not criticize the amount of territory that the United States would have had to yield under the separate article (null since Britain had not conquered the Floridas). His concern was the “seeds of distrust and jealousy” it would sow between the United States and “their allies.” He spoke more precisely in criticizing the article’s expressed preference for an “open enemy to a nation engaged in the same cause with us, and closely connected to our ally,” a preference, he thought that might allow Spain to feel justified in making a separate peace “without the least regard to our interest” if the article were avowed by the United States. Even greater evils were to be feared, he said, from having concealed it from the French. Laurens, Livingston reminded Congress, had reported that the British were boasting that they had outmaneuvered the French, and would try to create jealousies between the United States and their “good and great ally.” In the hands of Parliament, the Secretary argued, the separate article was “a most dangerous engine, “ and “a most powerful argument for continuing the war,” since it displayed resentment of Spain and distrust of France that could lead Britain to believe that “the quadruple knot is untied.”
Livingston believed the secret article had put his country at the edge of a dangerous precipice. Even if none of the evils he feared came to pass, he felt that the United States would still have to explain its breach of good faith with France to the world if the secret was revealed. He begged Congress to take steps that would prove that its repeated professions of fidelity to the alliance had not been made “to mask deceit.” This might be effected, he suggested, if Congress directed him to do three things: first, inform La Luzerne about the separate article in a manner designed “to remove any unfavorable impression it may make on the court of France of the sincerity of these States or their ministers;” second, tell the American commissioners that he had informed the French Minister and why; and third, instruct them to cede the Florida boundary specified in the article no matter what nation came to possess the territory. Finally, Livingston asked to be authorized to inform them that it was the sense of Congress that the preliminaries were “not to take place until a peace shall have been actualy signed” by Britain and France.
Livingston admitted that “many and powerful arguments” militated against his sentiments and recommendations. He felt “extreme pain,” he said, in advising a course that might “hurt the feelings of ministers to whom we are indebted for their continued zeal and assiduity, all of whom I respect, and with one of whom I have had the closest and most intimate friendship from our earliest youth.” Protesting that the duties of his office took precedence over the obligations of his friendship with Jay, he asked Congress to consider his recommendations and exercise its “better judgment” on those proposals.6
Congress debated his draft on 19 March. Abraham Clark (New Jersey), John Francis Mercer (Virginia), John Rutledge (South Carolina), Hugh Williamson (North Carolina), Arthur Lee (Virginia), Alexander Hamilton (New York), Richard Peters (Pennsylvania), Theodorick Bland Jr. (Virginia), James Wilson (Pennsylvania), Stephen Higginson (Massachusetts), and Madison were the principal participants. Mercer and Madison were the most critical of the commissioners’ violation of their instructions to confide in France and accept her direction. Clark, Rutledge, Williamson, Lee, Hamilton, Peters, Bland, Wilson, and Higginson considered that Vergennes might have released the commissioners from the obligation to consult him, and expressed approval of some if not all of their conduct. They also criticized the instructions of 15 June 1781 or voiced suspicions that France might indeed have attempted to limit British concessions to American demands. After a lengthy debate, Congress referred Livingston’s recommendations to a five-man committee (Clark, Gorham, Hamilton, Rutledge, and Wilson).7
In its report of 21 March the committee recommended that the commissioners be thanked for their “zeal and firmness.” It opposed informing La Luzerne about the separate article, and instead recommended that the American commissioners should inform the French court and, if possible, exclude it from the treaty with Britain. If this could not be done, it agreed that the boundaries specified in it should apply to whatever power received West Florida in the peace settlement.8 Finally, it suggested that Livingston should tell the commissioners that Congress regretted their failure to communicate the preliminary articles to France before they were signed.9
On 22 March, Livingston met with La Luzerne, who informed him once again, “though delicately,” that the French were displeased that the American commissioners had signed the preliminaries “separately” and reminded him that Britain’s attempts to sow discord between France and the United States had been aided by the “intimacy” between the American and British commissioners. Other parts of La Luzerne’s dispatches, Madison noted, were privately communicated to Boudinot and a select number of delegates the next day. They detailed French dissatisfaction at the “great indelicacy” exhibited by the American commissioners in signing the preliminaries before the French had signed their own treaty, and complained about Franklin’s “extravagant demands” for money at a time when Americans had not established revenues to meet their own needs.10
The debate in Congress continued through Monday, 24 March, a day after word reached Philadelphia that Britain and the co-belligerents had agreed to their own preliminaries on 20 January. This put an end to fears that the Anglo-American preliminaries would become effective before a general peace and removed concerns that Britain would use American mistrust of France as an incentive to continue the war, but it did not resolve the controversy over the commissioners’ decision to sign the preliminaries without France’s prior knowledge and advice. Congress adjourned without reaching any conclusions and did not meet on 25 March.11 Livingston, despairing of obtaining “any express decision” from that body, wrote the letter below without benefit of Congress’s “better judgment.”12
In his letter to Vergennes of 26 March, La Luzerne noted that when news of the general peace arrived, Congress was waiting for a committee to recommend how it should express displeasure with the American commissioners. He expected the committee to suggest severely reprimanding, and perhaps recalling them for having disregarded their instructions. Boudinot, he mentioned, had told him that the king’s silence on the subject had made Congress intensely aware that the commissioners’ conduct had exposed the United States to charges of bad faith and ingratitude even though Congress had strictly observed its obligations as ally. Arrival of the news of the general peace, he concluded, meant that censuring the commissioners would only serve to publicize a situation that was not generally known and was, thus, considered inadvisable.13
1. On the dispatches carried by the General Washington, see JJ to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 17 Nov. 1782, note 58. La Luzerne made a concerted effort to insure that Americans did not view the provisional articles as a signal that the war had ended. He seems to have persuaded Congress not to send an immediate ratification of them back to Europe on the General Washington. He convinced RRL that the complete text of the articles should not be released and that any extract published should not be invested with “Congress’ seal of authority.” He himself published “some paragraphs” in gazettes of nearby states presenting the articles in their “true point of view”—that the war had not ended. He also wrote to Washington to urge him not to support the “views of England” by “giving even tacit consent to a truce,” unless France concurred, and to delay any progress toward evacuation of New York. See La Luzerne to Vergennes, 15 Mar. 1783, in , 1: 785–86; and 19 Mar. 1783, FrPMAE: CP-EU, 23: 332r–333v.
2. On the commissioners’ failure to keep the French informed, see the editorial note “Tensions between Allies over the Peace Negotiations,” on pp. 300–302. Madison was certainly among the “sundry members” to whom La Luzerne complained about “the neglect of our Ministers to maintain a confidential intercourse. . . .” He also reported on La Luzerne’s and Barbé-Marbois’s conversations with RRL and other delegates about American conduct of peace negotiations. , 6: 329.
3. Here, Madison is referencing portions of Vergennes’s letter to La Luzerne of 19 Dec. 1782 in which the French minister had remarked that BF had “yielded too easily to the bias of his colleagues,” all of whose attention had been “taken up by the English.” See , 1: 727–29; and , 6: 328–29, 332, 355. In a letter of 24 Dec. 1782 Laurens had advised RRL that “Every engine has been, every degree of Craft under the mask of returning affection will be practiced, for creating Jealousies between the States & their good & great Ally.” He later reported that Pitt was boasting that Britain had obtained the provisional treaty without the concurrence of France and that it would gain great advantage from this. For Laurens’s attitude, see JJ to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 18 Sept., note 6, and the American Peace Commissioners to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 14 Dec. 1782, note 16, both above; and , 16: 99, 163.
For Shelburne’s and Strachey’s fears that they would suffer because of risks they had taken in the course of negotiations, see the editorial notes “John Jay Proposes Altering Richard Oswald’s Commission” and “The Preliminary Articles Are Signed” on pp. 108–11, 264–67.
4. See , 20: 30–34. Boudinot, thus, largely accepted the arguments presented by JJ in his letter to RRL of 17 Nov. 1782, above. He was, however, compelled to recognize French concerns in the course of conversation with La Luzerne and Virginia delegates Theodorick Bland Jr. and Arthur Lee. Bland, La Luzerne reported, expressed annoyance that the provisional articles would not take effect until a general peace had been agreed upon. He noted that Boudinot had expressed shock at this opinion and gave assurances that it was not shared by the majority of delegates. La Luzerne was alarmed that sentiment favoring immediate American withdrawal from the war would gain currency. He pointedly affirmed in a letter to the superintendant of finance that the desperately needed French loan for 1783, a portion of which had arrived with the provisional articles, had been explicitly granted to enable the United States to carry on the war and to compel the enemy “by joint Efforts” to conclude a permanent peace. Madison reported that publication of the preliminaries in the Pennsylvania press, unintended by Congress, was regrettable because it led France to suspect that Congress favored “premature” signing of the articles and wanted to convince Americans that France, not Britain, was responsible for delaying the peace. See La Luzerne to Vergennes, 19 Mar., 335r-v, cited above; and to Robert Morris, 15 Mar. 1783, , 7: 586–88; and , 6: 330.
5. See , 23: 637–39; and , 1: 790–93. Notification of this declaration would not have reached the commissioners prior to signing the preliminaries with Britain. The phrase “to the world” was not part of Congress’s resolution.
6. See , 6: 313–16; and , 6: 351, 352n.
7. See Madison’s “Notes on Debates,” , 6: 357–69.
8. See ibid., 375–78. Before the general articles of peace arrived, La Luzerne had expressed fear that Hessian troops stationed in New York would be sent to reconquer West Florida or to lay siege to New Orleans, and reported that he had no hope of getting the Americans to prevent their evacuation from New York. Writing to Vergennes on 26 Mar., when only a “summary” of the general articles of peace was available, La Luzerne assumed that the separate article had in fact determined the southern boundary of the United States, and reported that the loss of a degree would not occasion the “slightest murmur” from the Americans. The southern delegates, he indicated, rejoiced that the two Floridas had been ceded to Spain because they would no longer have the English as neighbors. See La Luzerne to Vergennes, 19 Mar., FrPMAE: CP-EU, 23: 340v–341r; and 26 Mar. 1783, in , 1: 812.
9. See , 6: 375–78; , 25: 714–15.
10. See , 393–96.
11. Lafayette prevailed on d’Estaing to carry news that a general peace had been achieved on the corvette Triumph, commanded by the chevalier Du Quesne. It also carried d’Estaing’s orders to recall French cruisers “to prevent the further effusion of blood at sea,” and Lafayette’s letters to the President of Congress, to RRL, and to George Washington, all 5 Feb. 1783. See , 5: 84–93.
12. As late as 1795, James Monroe continued to question whether the American peace commissioners’ suspicions of France were justified. See Benjamin Vaughan to Monroe, 18 Sept. 1795, : 340–47.
13. La Luzerne to Vergennes, 26 Mar. 1783, in , 1: 812.