For much of his tenure in office, Jay benefited from working alongside a state legislature and two presidential administrations that shared his Federalist leanings and facilitated his efforts to develop and implement policies for improving New York’s public health, economy, finances, and defenses. The state legislative elections and the subsequent presidential election of 1800, however, upended this political landscape, as these contests resulted in a resounding victory for Republicans.1

Under the skillful management of Aaron Burr, the three factions of New York’s Republican Party—Burrite, Livingstonian, and Clintonian—coordinated their efforts to wrest control of the state legislature from their Federalist opponents. Burr, who had already created a powerful network in the upstate counties, now focused on mobilizing Republican support in the City and County of New York. Moreover, Burr developed a comprehensive strategy in order to secure a successful Republican ticket: he began by including well-known figures—George Clinton and Horatio Gates—as candidates; he then publicized their service during the war of independence to establish stronger links between the Republican Party and New York’s revolutionary heritage; and lastly, Burr delayed the announcement of the Republican slate as a way of stymieing his Federalist opponents from launching an effective counter-strategy.2 Peter Augustus Jay recognized the critical role of Burr in organizing a successful statewide campaign for the Republicans. Reflecting on the election results, he observed, “It now appears that the Plans of the Democrats were commenced a considerable time ago & conducted with equal Secrecy & Judgement. Col. Burr contrived every thing & put every thing in Motion.”3

The Federalist campaign, by comparison, matched neither the vigor nor the astuteness displayed by Burr and his allies. New York’s Federalists were lulled into complacency by their previous victories at the ballot box, and showed little initiative in assembling a noteworthy list of candidates for the state legislature. The Federalist search for suitable nominees was further hindered by internal disputes within the party, and a general disinclination of prospective candidates to relocate to the state capitol in Albany.4 To be sure, the Federalists campaigned both on behalf of their candidates as well as against their opponents. Peter Augustus, for instance, assailed the character, motive, and experience of prominent Republican office-seekers—George Clinton, Horatio Gates, Brockholst Livingston, and Samuel Latham Mitchill—in a letter to the local press.5 Nonetheless, Peter Augustus conceded that his party fared poorly because his colleagues “were as usual supine till the eve of the Election”.6

With the votes tallied in early May, the extent of the Federalist losses became clear: the Republicans had swept the thirteen assembly seats allotted to the City and County of New York, and now held a majority in that body by twenty-eight seats. The Federalists still held a slim majority in the senate with seven seats, but the Republicans had made gains in three of the four senatorial districts, winning a total of ten seats as compared to two seats for the Federalists.7

The outcome of the legislative elections represented more than just a shift of power in New York’s state governance; these local contests also proved consequential in ushering in a Republican nominee, Thomas Jefferson, to the presidency. The process for choosing presidential electors in New York consisted of a combined vote taken by members of the legislature’s upper and lower houses. Due to their gains in the recent elections, the Republicans now held a majority of 85 combined seats (67 assemblymen and 18 senators), while their Federalist counterparts occupied only 65 combined seats (40 assemblymen and 25 senators). Under this arrangement, it seemed a certainty that the state’s twelve electoral votes would be cast in favor of a Republican presidential nominee, and thereby play a deciding role in determining the results of that contest.

Political observers residing in other states recognized the significance of New York’s legislative contest for the forthcoming presidential election. A newspaper printer in Philadelphia assessed the damage to Adams’s campaign, noting that “This election is viewed to be in its consequences of the highest importance as from this result Mr. JEFFERSON will obtain the votes of 12 electors, they being chosen by the legislature, which votes were at the last election all for Mr. ADAMS.”8 Federalist leaders, like the Massachusetts jurist Theophilus Parsons, were fearful that the proceedings in New York secured a presidential victory for Jefferson. Parsons warned Jay that this scenario was tantamount to an “important crisis,” that would bring to power “the great arch priest of Jacobinism and infidelity.”9 Parsons further confided that this turn of events produced “an anxiety which sometimes oppresses me, when I dare to look at what may be the fate of the United States.”10

Jay’s colleagues in New York also expressed alarm at the prospect of a Republican ascendancy, and the subsequent if uncertain fate that would befall the American republic. Peter Augustus’s assessment of New York’s recent elections reflected this sense of growing pessimism: “What will be the ultimate Consequences of this unfortunate Business I know not. if as is supposed it ensures the Election of Mr Jefferson, the Prospect is gloomy indeed”.11 Alexander Hamilton offered similar commentary, noting, “there will be an Anti-fœderal Majority in the Ensuing Legislature, and the very high probability is that this will bring Jefferson into the Chief Majistracy”.12 Hamilton went on to describe Jefferson as “an Atheist in Religion and a Fanatic in politics,” and echoing Parsons’s language of despair, claimed that his opponent’s rise to power constituted a “Crisis”.13 Hamilton’s father-in-law, Philip Schulyer, surmised that since Jefferson was “pervaded with mad french Philosophy,” he was therefore likely to draw the United States into a conflict with Britain.14

Schuyler and Hamilton asserted that Jay wielded the authority as governor to thwart Jefferson’s presidential ambitions and thereby prevent such dreaded outcomes. Each proposed separately that Jay take the extraordinary measure of reconvening the previous legislature in order to introduce and implement a new selection method for presidential electors. New York’s district voters would now choose the electors, and it was expected that under this system, a majority of the electors would cast their votes for the Federalist nominee.15 Schuyler and Hamilton admitted that theirs was an unorthodox and controversial plan that would draw accusations of unfairness from political opponents.16 Hamilton nonetheless assured Jay that this course of action “is justified by unequivocal reasons of public safety” and that it would receive approval from “The reasonable part of the world”.17 Schuyler offered similar support by explaining to Jay that this proposal was drawn up by “Our fœdral friends in Congress”, including John Marshall of Virginia.18

Jay’s outlook for the upcoming elections matched those of his Federalist associates. In late April, he informed Jedidiah Morse of the dismal political prospects facing New York and the nation, noting, “The approaching general Election in this State will be unusually animated. No arts or Pains will be spared to obtain an antifœderal Representation, in order to obtain an antifœderal President; and thro’ him divers other objects”.19 Yet, Jay believed that the political maneuver suggested by Hamilton and Schuyler constituted neither a fair nor feasible solution to the dilemma facing the Federalist Party. In his endorsement written on the reverse of Hamilton’s letter, Jay penned the following remark: “Gen. Hamilton 7 May 1800 proposing a measure for party purposes wh I think it wd. not become me to adopt—”.20 Beyond this brief note, Jay offered no further explanation for refusing to take the proposed action on behalf of the Federalists. A healthy disdain for open partisanship and procedural irregularities provides some insight into why Jay did not carry out the scheme. As he observed to state lawmakers in his opening address before the legislature in November: “Our Governments are yet in a course of experiment; and care should be taken that it be a fair experiment, and that it be not interrupted by those tendencies to innovation, which certain passions, when too fervent, sometimes produce.”21 Moreover, decades of combined public serving as a state governor, as chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, chief justice of the New York Supreme Court of Judicature, and primary author of the New York State Constitution, instilled in him a healthy respect for the rule of law. Accordingly, Jay undoubtedly recognized that although it might be within his executive authority to change the electoral system, it went against the tenets of constitutionalism to carry out such an action for the purpose of political expediency.