From James Madison to Soliman Melimeni, 5 February 1806
To Soliman Melimeni
Department of State Washington 5 Feby 1806
Sir,
After a delay rendered unavoidable by the pressure of other business, I now acknowledge the receipt of the letter of the 31st December which by order of His Excely the Bey of Tunis, you addressed to the President of the United States,1 on the topics which have been brought into discussion.
The determination of the Bey to observe a strict impartiality during the late war between the UStates and Tripoli was the just dictate of his Amicable relation to both parties, and it ought moreover to be regarded as a proof of the enlightened policy with which he has kept in view the welfare of his people, which another course of conduct would necessarily have exposed to hazard. In proportion as the President has been impressed by so laudable a system on the part of the Bey, would be his regret, that in prosecuting the necessary measures against an enemy, any injury should have accrued to Tunisian subjects from irregular Acts of the American Naval force or any umbrage been taken at steps authorized by reason and the invariable custom of nations at War. Orders have consequently been given for examining scrupulously into the circumstances which attended the capture of the Xebeque commanded by Rais Hassan bo ally’ and her two prizes; and you may be persuaded, that as far as the result shall require, the determination of the President will be a proof of his friendly disposition towards the Bey.
Among the true views of things which your embassy to this side of the Atlantic must have afforded you the means of obtaining, you cannot have been insensible of the respect with which your Government like all others in friendship with the United States is regarded; and you will have seen in the marks of esteem procured to yourself by your deportment and character a confirmation of what the President has expressed to the Bey in his letter of 27 Jany 18042 respecting the dissatisfaction given by Mr Cathcart and how contrary it was to his expectation to learn that the American Commodore should be charged with any want of the respect due both to the rank and personal qualities of His Excellency the Bey. Whether this and the other measures dissatisfactory to the Bey were occasioned by the mistatement imputed to Mr Davis, or by any other circumstances, it may not now be important to enquire, if the good understanding between the two Countries shall be effectually consolidated for the time to come.
As far as respects Mr Davis it is hoped, that the Bey will feel perfect contentment, from the proposed change of his residence in concurrence with his own wishes to another place; and particularly when it is recollected that as the good qualities, which recommended Mr Davis as the temporary agent at Tunis, were not before the events of August last unfelt and unacknowledged, the magnanimity of the Bey will be the more ready to throw a viel over the unfavorable appearances incident to that crisis.
It has given the President much satisfaction to find that tho’ some of the agents of the United States have acted in a manner, which has been viewed as offensive, still the value attached by the Bey to the continuance of peace, and his just distinction between the precipitancy of public Agents and the moderation of their Governments have been guards to the Amicable correspondence which has so long prevailed. Of the sincerity of the Government of the United States in cultivating it, liberal proofs have from time to time been afforded. Among these was the triennial present offered thro’ Mr Cathcart3 which was judged to be the last step in establishing its character for generosity. In the refusal of this offer the President was less disposed to trace any want of respect or friendship in the Bey towards the U States than to ascribe it to motives consistent with both. As the offer however not coinciding with the views of the Bey at that time was not accepted, and as it formed a part of more general arrangements of the UStates which are not applicable to the present time, the Bey will do justice to the motives of the President in not renewing such an offer, and in leaving the relations between the United States and Tunis on the precise footing of the Treaty as it stands, or as it may be varied in any particulars by mutual consent for the mutual advantage of the parties. To convert the pecuniary offer into an equivalent of maritime stores would still less consist with the views of the U States whose interest more and more requires them to husband and have in readiness for themselves, the materials for strengthening and extending their naval force. I have the honor &c
(signed) James Madison
Tr (ViU: Madison Papers, Special Collections); Tr (MiU-C).
1. In his 31 Dec. 1805 letter to Jefferson (DNA: RG 59, CD, Tunis, vol. 3; 12 pp.; in a clerk’s hand, signed in Arabic by Melimeni, with appended note by James Leander Cathcart stating that he had written the letter at Melimeni’s behest and that when he read an Italian translation to Melimeni and his translator, both had declared it a perfect translation of the instructions Melimeni had received from the bey), Melimeni stated that in April 1805 a Tunisian ship with two Sicilian prizes had attempted to enter Tripoli harbor for water and provisions and was taken by John Rodgers, who declared the ship’s passport out-of-date and sent it and the crew into Malta as pirates. Hammuda Bey then wrote to Rodgers asking the return of the ship and promising satisfaction should the papers prove irregular, which request Rodgers refused in a “very disrespectful manner.” The angry Hammuda Bey considered immediate war, but recalling that his treaty with the United States required a year’s notice, he decided to uphold his agreement. It was with much surprise that he then found the whole American squadron in the Bay of Tunis and was presented with letters from Tobias Lear and Rodgers, the former very friendly and containing a letter from Jefferson and the latter demanding the bey’s assent to its contents within thirty-six hours. Consul George Davis held Rodgers’s letter for twenty-four hours before delivering it, which left Hammuda Bey only twelve hours for deliberation, too short a period for such a decision, so he requested Davis to tell Rodgers and Lear that he was still open to accommodation and asked them to come ashore. Davis misrepresented the bey’s wishes and advised Lear and Rodgers not to trust themselves ashore; he then told the bey that he had found them “obstinate” and “determined not to land.” Later letters from Lear led the Tunisians to believe Davis had fomented discord between the negotiators. Davis said that if Hammuda Bey did not give him a reply to Rodgers’s letter, he would leave Tunis immediately. Stephen Decatur, who had brought Lear’s letter ashore, became concerned and had the American interpreter deliver it. Hammuda Bey then wrote expressing a desire to negotiate with Lear and Rodgers but without Davis’s presence. Lear said that it was now out of his power to come ashore, since all future negotiations were in the hands of Rodgers and Davis. The bey, seeing that “the doors of amicable negotiation were shut against him,” decided to send an ambassador to Jefferson and asked if the squadron would accommodate him, to which Rodgers agreed, after which Lear and the squadron officers called on Hammuda Bey. Melimeni added that he was further instructed to inform Jefferson that Hammuda Bey was “in the habit of receiving presents” of marine and military supplies from nations with which he was at peace, some triennially and some “arbitrarily,” but from the United States he had received only what was stipulated by the peace treaty. While Melimeni acknowledged that Cathcart had offered a permanent triennial gift of $24,000, he stated that the bey did not need cash, but supplies in kind were essential for the defense of his country and were consistent with his customs, and because Jefferson had an “abundance of those articles,” the bey demanded only a part of those superfluities as a proof of American friendship. Melimeni was also commanded to lay the enclosed papers (not found) before Jefferson. For Davis’s and Lear’s accounts of the negotiations at Tunis, see 10:83–86, 265–73, 279–88. For the captured Tunisian ship, see ibid., 9:483 n. 2.
2. For Jefferson’s 27 Jan. 1804 letter to Hammuda Bey, see , 3:361–62.