D, in Alexander Hamilton’s writing, DLC:GW; copy, DNA:PCC, item 152; copy, PHi: Wayne Papers; copy, NHi: McDougall Papers. The text within square brackets is taken from the copy in DNA:PCC. For other significant variations in the wording on that copy and the copy in the Wayne Papers, see notes 4 and 7.

GW docketed the manuscript in DLC:GW: “Order of March and Battle German Town 4th Octr 1777.” Although the battle occurred on that date, the context of the orders indicates that they were issued the previous day, 3 October.

Lt. James McMichael of Greene’s division wrote in his diary entry for 3 Oct.: “Early this morning orders were issued for the troops to be furnished with two days cooked provisions, and each man served with forty rounds of ammunition. At noon the sick were sent to Bethlehem, which indicates that a sudden attack is intended. At 6 P.M. the whole army marched, with Gen. Greene’s division in the advance” ((“McMichael’s Diary,” description begins William P. McMichael. “Diary of Lieutenant James McMichael, of the Pennsylvania Line, 1776–1778.” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 16 (1892): 129–59. description ends 152).

The following general orders of 3 Oct., signed by Timothy Pickering as adjutant general, appear in Muhlenberg’s orderly book: “Twenty men from each Brigade who are not fit to endure the Fatigues of a March either for want of Shoes or otherwise with a Sub. from each Brigade, to parade at the Park of Artillery at 5 o’clock this afternoon. Two field Officers will be there to take the Command of them who will receive their instructions from the Major Genl of the Day. Three empty waggons from each Brigade with good horses to parade in the Road in rear of the 2d Line and move on in the rear when the Army marches.

“The whole Army to be under arms this evening at 6 o’clock they are to leave their packs, Blankets and everything except arms, accoutrements ammunition and provision they are to take their provision in their Habersacks, such as have not Habersacks are to take their provision in their Pockets, or in such other manner as may be most Convenient. All the Pioneers of each Regt & Division who are fit to march are to move in front of their respective Divisions with all the Axes they can muster” (“Muhlenberg’s Orderly Book,” description begins “Orderly Book of Gen. John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26–December 20, 1777.” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 33 (1909): 257–78, 454–74; 34 (1910): 21–40, 166–89, 336–60, 438–77; 35 (1911): 59–89, 156–87, 290–303. description ends 35:63).

Pickering says in his journal entry for 3 Oct.: “The troops were got ready for marching, it being intended to make an attack upon the enemy the next morning. In the evening, about eight o’clock, the troops were on the march, in the following disposition: General Sullivan, commanding the right wing, was to move down, with his and Wayne’s divisions, on the direct road to Germantown, preceded by Conway’s brigade, which was to take off the enemy’s picket, file off to the right, and fall upon the enemy’s left flank and rear, while Sullivan’s and Wayne’s divisions attacked them in front. Maxwell’s and the North Carolina [Nash’s] brigades were to form a second line in rear of Sullivan and Wayne. General Greene, with the left wing, was to move down the North Wales road to attack the enemy’s right, the front line of this wing being composed of Greene’s and McDougall’s divisions, and the second line, of Stephen’s; while Smallwood, with his Maryland, and Forman, with his Jersey militia, were to attack them on their right flank and rear. At the same time General Armstrong, with his division of Pennsylvania militia, was to move down the old Egypt or Schuylkill road, and take off a Hessian picket posted there, and attack the enemy’s left wing and rear. The attack was to begin upon every quarter at five in the morning” (Pickering and Upham, Life of Pickering description begins Octavius Pickering and Charles W. Upham. The Life of Timothy Pickering. 4 vols. Boston, 1867–73. description ends , 1:166–67; for the disposition of the attacking American troops, see also GW to Hancock, 5 Oct., and John Sullivan to Meshech Weare, 25 Oct. 1777, in Hammond, Sullivan Papers description begins Otis G. Hammond, ed. Letters and Papers of Major-General John Sullivan, Continental Army. 3 vols. Concord, 1930-39. In Collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society, vols. 13–15. description ends , 1:542–47).

To execute this complicated four-pronged plan of attack, GW had available about eleven thousand men, of whom about eight thousand were Continentals and about three thousand were militia (see Council of War, 28 Sept.). The Continentals composed the two principal attacking columns commanded by Sullivan and Greene and the reserve forces supporting them. Including the reserves, Sullivan’s column, which attacked Howe’s left wing along Germantown Road, apparently had a strength of about three thousand men, and Greene’s column, which attacked the British right wing along Lime Kiln Road, apparently included about five thousand men. “The Reason of our Sending So many Troops to attack their right,” Sullivan wrote Meshech Weare on 25 Oct., “was because it was supposed That if This wing of the Enemy could be forced their army must have been pushed into the Sculkill or have been compelled to Surrender. Therefore Two Thirds of the Army at Least were Detached to oppose the Enemys Right” (ibid., 543). The militia were assigned to the two outside flanking columns that advanced respectively along the Schuylkill River about two miles west of Germantown and the Old York Road a similar distance east of the town (see notes 5 and 6).

Howe’s army at Germantown had been depleted by the detachment on 26 Sept. of Cornwallis with the British and Hessian grenadiers and two squadrons of light dragoons to occupy Philadelphia about five miles to the southeast and the departure three days later of the 10th and 42d Regiments to attack the Billingsport fort on the Delaware River, deployments of which GW was aware and which prompted his decision to attack on 4 Oct. (see GW to Hancock, 5 Oct.). On that date there probably were seven to eight thousand British and Hessian troops in the vicinity of Germantown, but the effective combat strength may have been less. A report to Hessian general Ditfurth says that “had General Washington’s attack been as well carried out as it had been planned, our army which did not consist of more than 5000 combatants would have been in a very critical position, for twelve of the strongest battalions were detached” (cited in McGuire, Surprise of Germantown description begins Thomas J. McGuire. The Surprise of Germantown, or, The Battle of Cliveden, October 4th 1777. Gettysburg, Pa., 1994. description ends , 103 n.48; see also ibid., 31, and Chastellux, Travels in North America description begins Marquis de Chastellux. Travels in North America in the Years 1780, 1781 and 1782. Translated and edited by Howard C. Rice, Jr. 2 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963. description ends , 1:137).

Howe’s army was well posted, however, in terrain that strongly favored the defenders. Germantown consisted of a series of mostly stone houses scattered for about two miles along Germantown Road, which ran northwest from Philadelphia toward Reading. Most of the houses faced the road, and behind them stretched a multitude of enclosed fields and orchards divided by walls, fences, hedges, and lanes perpendicular to the main road. Any attack along Germantown Road would inevitably be disorganized by the necessity of crossing those man-made obstacles as well as the area’s numerous creeks, ravines, and low hills (map 4).

Howe’s main line of defense, located a short distance southeast of the town’s market square, also lay at right angles to Germantown Road. The left wing, which was commanded by General Knyphausen, extended southwest parallel with School House Lane from Germantown Road to the Schuylkill River, where Lieutenant Colonel Wurmb’s Hessian jägers occupied a small redoubt on Manatawny Road near the mouth of Wissahickon Creek. The rest of Knyphausen’s wing consisted of General Stirn’s Hessian brigade and the British 3d and 4th Brigades commanded respectively by generals Charles Grey and James Agnew. The right wing, which was commanded by Gen. James Grant, paralleled Church Lane, which ran northeast from the square to Luken’s Mill near the junction with Lime Kiln Road. It consisted of Gen. Edward Mathew’s corps of guards, six regiments of British regulars, and two squadrons of light dragoons. Outer security to the north and west was provided by the Queen’s Rangers on the Old York Road, the 1st Light Infantry Battalion on Lime Kiln Road, and the 2d Light Infantry Battalion and Lt. Col. Thomas Musgrave’s 40th Regiment on Germantown Road. The 2d Light Infantry was on Mount Pleasant, a small hill about two miles northwest of the market square, with pickets posted a short distance up Germantown Road at Mount Airy, the country seat of former Pennsylvania chief justice William Allen, Senior. The 40th Regiment, which was camped near Benjamin Chew’s country estate Cliveden about halfway between Mount Pleasant and the square, was in position to support either of the light infantry battalions in case of need (see Howe to Germain, 10 Oct. 1777, in Davies, Documents of the American Revolution description begins K. G. Davies, ed. Documents of the American Revolution, 1770–1783; (Colonial Office Series). 21 vols. Shannon and Dublin, 1972–81. description ends , 14:202–9; John Eager Howard to Timothy Pickering, 29 Jan. 1827, in Md. Mag. description begins Maryland Historical Magazine. Baltimore, 1906–. description ends , 4:314–20; and McGuire, Surprise of Germantown description begins Thomas J. McGuire. The Surprise of Germantown, or, The Battle of Cliveden, October 4th 1777. Gettysburg, Pa., 1994. description ends , 15–16).

For accounts of the Battle of Germantown on 4 Oct., see GW to Hancock, 5 Oct., and the notes to that document; see also Anthony Wayne to GW, 4 Oct., and GW to Benjamin Harrison, 5 October.