To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 14 November 1779
From Major General Nathanael Greene
West Point Nov. 14th 1779
Sir
Your Excellency undoubtedly has freequently had under consideration a proper position for Winter quarters. It is not always in the power of a General to take a position most favorable to his wishes on account of provision & forage, or to place himself in the most advantageous point of view, for covering the Country and securing his Capital Posts. A certainty with respect to Provision & forage are objects of the first consideration in taking a Position. All inferior evils, of what ever nature, may in some sort be remedied, by foresight and precaution; but there is no contending with hunger. Therefore what would be considered only as secondary objects in some cases become principals here.1
In the choice of a position we must pay some regard to the Enemy’s collected force, and to our divided condition, in which the Army must of necessity be cantond. The Enemy now appear to be puting their Troops into Winter quarters;2 but it cannot be supposd they will remain inactive all Winter, if we by the manner of cantoning the Army open to them an opportunity of insulting us to advantage. The mischievous consequences of having our quarters beat up in the dead of Winter, cannot readily be foreseen. That it would be their duty and interest to lay hold of such an opportunity no body can deny; and that the charactor of the General,3 and many National circumstances, lead to the supposition must be agreed to. It is necessary therefore to take a position which will secure us from a surprize and have as much force together as possible to free us from insult. The place where and the force necessary to these ends are the two capital points to decide upon.
The command of the North River is an object of such importance that the force and supplies necessary for this purpose must be had at all events. The force requisite for these Garrisons, I suppose has been very judiciously calculated by General de Portail, and I imagine there cannot be any great variation from his report.4
Your Excellency will find after detaching a proper force for this place, a covering party for the State of Connecticut, and the other necessary guards for Kings ferry Stores, and Posts of communication, your force will be greatly inferior to that of the Enemy’s; and it will be growing more and more so as the service of the Soldiers expires. It will be necessary therefore to endeavor to remedy, by the strength of ground, the deficiency [of] force.
I have no doubt but that every State, bordering upon the Enimy, will apply for a proper force to protect them against their ravages:5 To comply with these demands will hazzard the safety of the whole Army: Divide your force and you will fall a prey in every quarter. And I am perswaded was you to adopt the plan which would be most flattering to the wishes of the people, it would be so far from affording them that protection and security which they promise themselves, that it would become one of the principal causes of the enemy’s making inroads and committing depradations upon them.
There can be but two modes of cantonment, to prevent the Enemy from disturbing us in quarters. One is to keep such a force together as to bid defiance to all their menaces; the other is to disperse the Troops in such a manner as to afford no object. The first is infinitely the most favorable to dicipline and oeconemy: To disperse the Troops among the Inhabitants will be attended with a certain loss of dicipline to the Soldiery; and a general corruption of manners among the people. They will mutually debauch each other. Besides these disadvantages, the expence and waste of stores will be nearly double; and a great addition to the list of Staff Officers (already too numerous from the state of our Money) will be found necessary. For these and many other reasons, too obvious to need explanation, dispersing the Troops should be avoided of all events.
What ever covering is given to any part of the Country, except where the principal force is stationed, should be so calculated as to be able to check the Enemy’s small ravaging parties, and yet not be an object worthy any considerable movement of their’s.
From the representation of both the Commisary General and the Forage Master General,6 I find your Excellency will be obligd to quarter the Troops in New Jersy.
The great consumption of forage that has taken place in this State for five months past, will render it very difficult to provide for this garrison, and the different Posts of communication.
In cantoning the Troops and drawing supplies for their subsistence, it may not be amiss to have an eye to the affairs of next Campaign. The expence and difficulty of transportation from the Western States, your Excellency is perfectly acquainted with. You are also sensible that the long tract of barren Country, through which the supplies must come, will only admit of a certain quantity of transportation; therefore I conceive that good policy points out the necessity, of keeping as many stores in reserve in this State, as possible.
This is necessary not only to be prepard for any emergency that may happen from the Enemy’s turning their force against the Eastern States; but to have a magazine in readiness for a secret purpose, which your Excellency hinted to me a few days since.7
The further we move our main force to the Westward, and still be within supporting distance of this Garrison, the better: Both for the preservation of the provision and forage of this State, as well as to lessen the general expence of transportation. And the greater stock of provision & forage we can leave in this State, and upon the communications, the less difficulty we shall find in giving support to this place Should the Enemy approach it.
I should recommend, therefore, to quarter the Army as far westward as Morris Town or Baskenridge.8 The Country is strong, secure from a surprize, happily situated to receive supplies of provision & forage, and not very inconvenient for giving protection and cover to the Inhabitants.
It is true it is a considerable remove from this place. But was we to take a position at Suffrans or Pompton,9 the consumption of forage would be so great, that it would destroy the possibility of keeping up a communication with the Western States, however pressing the necessity, before the grass season. Suppose the Enemy should move up early in the Spring and lay siege to West Point. and the supplies of this State prove unequal to our support, should we not be obligd to abandon it to its fate?
There is another objection to the Suffran or Pompton position, which is the advantage it gives the Enemy of dividing our attention, by taking Post at Kings ferry. It will be impossible for us to determin which is their object, the Camp or West Point;10 and it will be almost as dangerous to expose our Camp, as these Garrisons; especially early in the Spring, when we have all our baggage about us, and no possibility of moving it off.
If we take a position near Morris we can always tell, by the motions of the Enemy, what is their object; and having our Camp in a secure situation, should they turn their force towards this place, we can march to its relief in such force as to give certain support; and at the same time leave our Camp in perfect security.
The fortifications here are so strong,11 and the Garrison will be so numerous that I think we have but little to fear, either from a surprize or storm; and therefore we have only to guard against an investiture or Siege.
As the Enemy have the advantage of a water transportation, and the Spring the most difficult part of the year for a land conveyance, it is most probable, if they have any designs upon this Post, they will commence their operations before the grass season. Will it not be worth while therefore to form a small Magazine of Provision & forage at or near Mr Erskine’s Iron works, for the purpose of subsisting the Army on their march to this place?12 And another considerable Magazine of Provision and forage at Chester or Warwick, for the support of this Army in what ever position it may take for the releif of this Garrison?13 These Magazines should be formd from the Westward in the Winter season, when there is the least call for transportation and the roads the most favorable for the purpose.
I imagin there will be great interest made for the Eastern Troops to be posted on the Eastside of the North River to favor their recruiting. These reasons have somthing plausable in them; but I have my doubts with respect to their truth and reality: Men, when they are near home, are much more influenced by domestick attachments than they are when they are at a great distance. The friends and Relations of the Soldiers very seldom use their influence to engage them in the service. On the contrary they commonly make use of every argument to disswade them from it. I am of opinion, therefore, the farther the Troops are removed from home the more favorable it will be to the recruiting service in Camp. There is but one reason for cantoning the Eastern Troops on the East side of the North River, and that is, they are more convenient to receive their State Stores; but this is so triffleing a consideration that it ought to have no weight; when it is opposd to so many more important considerations.
My present opinion favors the following disposition of the Troops for Winter quarters. The Garrison here should consist of Patterson’s, Learnard’s, Clinton’s, and the North Carolinia brigades, which I believe will form a force sufficient for the purpose. If the Horse Is Posted in Connecticut, as seems to be thought on, I think the Troops coming from Rhode Island in conjunction with the Horse, will form a sufficient covering party for the exposd parts of Connecticut and West Chester.14 I would only wish Clinton’s brigade to be here because it may interest the Inhabitants to furnish supplies in the Winter, and to encourage the Militia to turn out with spirit, should the Enemy make a sudden move towards the Post.15 The connection between the Army and the Country will have an influence in both these respects.
The Delaware Regiment can furnish guards for King’s ferry, and the Stores at Ringwood, should your Excelly think proper to establish a Magazine there. I mention this Regiment for this service because it seems to be unconnected with any Brigade, Or at least the Maryland brigades are complete with out it.16
The rest of the Troops, I would quarter as before mentioned some where not far distant from Morris or Baskenridge, according as wood and water may favor a position.
Should the Enimy make any considerable detachments from New York, a larger covering party may be necessary for the State of Connecticut, as I should have more apprehensions of their committing depradations, if they detach, than if they don’t; for then they will have nothing left but to play the small game.
The earlier the position is fixed upon the better for quartering the Army: I wish your Excellency, therefore, as soon as you have decided in your mind, the places and force requisite for each side of the North River and the Garrison for these Fortifications, you would please to acquaint me therewith, as it will be a more perfect guide to my conduct, in making the preparations for cantoning the Army.17 I am with great respect Your Excellen[c]ys Most Obedient humble Sert
Nath. Greene Q.M.G.
ALS, DLC:GW; ADf, MiU-C: Greene Papers. Greene dated his draft 13 November.
1. Anticipating his report to GW on winter quarters for the army, Greene had written Jeremiah Wadsworth, commissary general of purchases, from West Point on 1 Nov.: “I wish you to give me the best information you can respecting the place from whence you expect the greatest supplies of provision for the support of our Army this Winter. This information is essential to determin upon a proper position for winter quarters. The State of the forage and the routes on which the provision must come will determin the place. Provision and forage are the two most important matters for the General [Washington] to take into consideration. Necessity will oblige him to accomodate his measures to these points regardless of all inferior circumstances” ( 5:3). Wadsworth replied to Greene on the same date that he anticipated the most bread from Pennsylvania and Maryland and a significant amount of grain from New York ( 5:3).
Writing Moore Furman, deputy quartermaster for New Jersey, on 3 Nov., Greene revealed some of GW’s thinking about a winter encampment: “His Excellency General Washington has changed his mind with respect to the position of the Scotch Plains for winter quarters, and he has not positively fixed upon any other, but seem rather to turn his attention to Morris Town or some place in the neighbourhood of it” ( 5:8–9). GW apparently had determined in September to establish the army’s winter encampment at Scotch Plains, N.J. (see Richard Claiborne to John Cox, 16 Sept., and Greene to Furman, 17 Sept., in 4:388, 393).
A letter of 4 Nov. from Greene to Lt. Col. James Abeel, deputy quartermaster general, began a concerted search for an appropriate encampment location: “The weather begins to get cold and puts us in mind of Winter quarters. …
“I think from the conversation I have had with the General and other reasons I have for such a belief, the Army will hut not many miles distant from Morris Town. I would wish you therefore to exaimine all the Country within eight or ten Miles of that place, and see if a good tract of woodland is to be found with a sufficient quantity of water for the use of the Army. You will begin away down below Baskenridge and search the Country on towards Chatham, and from Chatham to Boontown. Taking particular care to minute down on paper the particular circumstances of each place, the relative distances from Morristown. Noting the water, wood and make of ground, together with the Roads leading too and from each place; and the number of Houses there may be found in the Neighbourhood.
“I am to request you will set out on this business the moment this letter comes to hand; and you are not to let any person know any thing of the matter, unless it is Lord Stirling, who you may advise with and consult upon the ocasion, as his knowledge and opinion will be of great weight in the matter” ( 5:12–13). For the efforts of Abeel and Major General Stirling to assess locations, see Abeel to Greene, 7 Nov. (second letter) and 10 Nov., and Stirling to Greene, 8 and 9 Nov., in 5:26, 32, 44–45. For more on the establishment of winter quarters, see Greene to Abeel and to Stirling, both 15 Nov., in 5:77–78, 81–82; see also GW to Greene, 17 Nov., and Greene to GW, 17, 20, 23, and 27 November.
Specific preparations for the army to winter in northerly New Jersey began when Greene wrote Furman from West Point on 15 Nov. to ready himself to move materials (see 5:78–79). Furman subsequently wrote Greene from Trenton on Monday, 22 Nov.: “I have your favour of —— wrote at Morris Town and am doing every thing in my power to hasten on all supplies its possible to get. I have wrote and sent to every Person forwarding Boards. there has been upwards of a hundred thousand feet sent on already which by reason of the uncertainity of the spot is laid down in different places … I have had great pleasure for Day or two in seeing several hundred Barrels Flour go out of town for Camp which hope will arrive in time to prevent the Army from too long fast—On inquiry find there is not Twenty Barrel of Provisions in the post to send on.
“Last Saturday I waited on our Assembly and informed them of the impossibility of supplying the Army with Forage without Their aid. they are willing to do anything that shall be necessary for the purpose if the other States would but joyn them but thats the work of time I told them our wants were immediate. They have promised to do something but fear nothing short of restricting the prices will induce the Farmers to spare their grain freely and they say it will be unjust to restrain their Constituents when all the other States are free” ( 39–40, and 5:107; see also James Burnside to Daniel Marsh, 20 Nov., and Furman to Clement Biddle, 27 Nov., in 40–43).
Brig. Gen. Jedediah Huntington wrote his brother Maj. Joshua Huntington from Peekskill, N.Y., on 17 Nov.: “Your favour of the 10th of the Month I received this Evening. … the Army are about making their Arrangments for Winter. You ask how they are cloathed. very indifferently I assure you; the immense Quantities of Timber which they have carried on their Backs & in their Arms to build their Huts last season & the many Forts which have been made since together with other constant Fatigue has worn out all their Cloaths” ( 435–36).
2. For evidence that the British forces around New York City had commenced winter preparations earlier in November, see 204, and 182–83.
3. Greene is referring to the British commander, Gen. Henry Clinton. Throughout the fall, rather than contemplate an attack on GW’s army, Clinton consolidated his forces around New York City with an eye toward sending detachments southwards, especially for offensive operations against South Carolina (see Clinton to George Germain, 26 and 30 Sept., 26 and 28 Oct., and 17 Nov., in 17:221–22, 229–30, 236–38; see also 145–47, 151–54).
4. For Duportail’s report on the troops necessary to secure West Point, the key to controlling the Hudson River, see GW to Duportail, 22 Sept., and Duportail to GW, 24 September. Duportail’s report enumerated a need for 2,880 men at the various defensive installations.
5. For concern over possible British incursions into Connecticut, see Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., to GW, 5 Nov.; see also GW to Trumbull, 12 and 20 November. For similar anxieties in Rhode Island, see William Greene to Nathanael Greene, this date, in 5:64–69.
6. Clement Biddle, commissary general of forage, had written Greene on 6 Nov. that the winter encampment could not be “more northerly than ten to twelve miles” from the principal source of hay near Quibbletown Gap, N.J. (DLC:GW, and 5:22–23). For the concerns of the commissary general of purchases, see Wadsworth to GW, 8 November.
7. GW’s “secret purpose” has not been ascertained.
8. Morristown is just under sixty miles southwest of West Point. Basking Ridge is roughly eight miles further southwest from Morristown.
9. A little more than twenty miles separated West Point from Suffern, New York. Pompton is south of Suffern about ten miles.
10. King’s Ferry, N.Y., was just over ten miles south of West Point and about the same distance northeast of Suffern.
11. For the West Point fortifications, see GW to Alexander McDougall, 19 June, n.2.
12. Robert Erskine, GW’s primary cartographer, maintained an ironworks adjacent to his home in Ringwood, New Jersey.
13. About seventeen miles separated Chester, N.Y., and West Point, but only roads looping to the north or south—adding significantly to that distance—connected the two places. Warwick, N.Y., is at least twenty-three miles southwest of West Point and about eight miles southwest of Chester.
14. Greene wrote his deputy quartermaster Nehemiah Hubbard from West Point on 15 Nov.: “His Excellency concludes to quarter the Horse in the Western parts of Conecticut. … Forage and materials for hutting are the two principal articles to be attended to” ( 5:79–80).
For the movement of troops through Connecticut from Rhode Island, see GW to Horatio Gates, 2, 13, and 16 Nov., and Gates to GW, 8 and 15 November.
15. Brig. Gen. James Clinton’s brigade of four New York regiments was then in New Jersey and remained in that state through the winter.
16. Unattached and stationed in New Jersey during November, the Delaware Regiment joined Brig. Gen. Mordecai Gist’s brigade in December and encamped for the winter with his Maryland regiments near Morristown.
17. GW outlined the disposition of his command during the winter in a letter to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates written at West Point on 17 November. GW presumably shared this information with Greene before that officer left West Point on that date (see Greene to Samuel Holden Parsons, 16 Nov., in 5:87).