To George Washington from Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, 14 March 1780
From Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens
Charles Town [S.C.] 14th March 1780.
Dear General.
The Enemys present disposition of his force and all his late operations indicate a design to attack Charles Town by a siege in form.1 To complete the investiture he must introduce his Ships of war into the harbour—that it is his intention appears from his fixing buoys on the bar, barricading his Ships wastes—and anchoring them in a station where they may embrace the first favorable spring-tides to enter—His Transports and Store ships have removed from Edisto Up Stono River where they lie contiguous to Wappoo Cut, which is the water communication from thence to Ashley River—At a point of the Main-Land formed by the issuing of the former into the latter, he raised in the course of a night, the 11th inst., a battery of six embrasures—This Situation naturally advantageous he will probably render very strong, and establish in it his deposit of military Stores and provisions2—He then may either force a passage over Ashley River, or turn it by a circuitous march—fortify a camp on the neck and open his trenches. The best communication between his magazines and Camp will be across Ashley River, from a bluff marked Bull in your large map.3
Your Excellency will have learnt that the Commodore and all his officers renounce the idea of defending the passage of the bar—they declare it impracticable for the Frigates to lie in a proper position for that purpose4—The Government has neglected to provide floating batteries which might have been stationed there—so that it has been agreed as the next best plan to form a line of battle in such a manner as to make a cross fire with Fort Moultrie, a shoal called the middle grounds being on the right of the Ships, and the Fort Advanced of the left—As it wd be the Enemys policy, with a leading wind and tide to pass the fire of the Fort, and run aboard of our Ships, the Commodore is contriving an obstruction which he thinks will check their progress—and allow time for the full effect of our fire5—The impracticability of defending the bar in the first instance appears to me a great diminution of our means of defence—We must not only have, a greater number of Shipping below, and consequently withdraw them from flanking the Enemys approaches on the neck—but are subject to the chances of a combat, which in the other case were out of the question—The Commodore has destroyed one set of the Enemys buoys and I hope he will cut away such as may have been since put down—and order the Galleys to give All possible annoyance to the enemys Ships in the act of entering.
The Attention of the Engineers has been distracted by different demonstrations on the part of the Enemy—and they have not perfected the Line across Charles Town Neck—henceforward I hope they will confine themselves solely to completing it—and then proceed to the construction of some interior inclosed works—to prolong the defence.
As the Enemy is determined to proceed by regular approaches—all his operations are submitted to calculation—and he can determine with mathematical precision that with Such & such means in a given time he will accomplish his end—Our Safety then must depend upon the seasonable arrival of such Reinforcements as will oblige him to raise the siege—The Virginia Line is much more remote than we could have thought it would have been at this moment6—Your Excellency in person might rescue us—All Virginia and No. Carolina would follow you—The Glory of foiling the Enemy in his last great effort, and terminating the war—ought to be reserved for you7—Whatever Fortune attends us I shall to my latest moment, feel that veneration and attachment which I always had for Your Excellency—And I beg leave to continue to subscribe myself your faithful Aid
John Laurens.
I entreat your Excellencys pardon for transmitting the annexed letter in its present imperfect state—it was a sketch which I intended to have put in better form—if time had permitted.
ALS, DLC:GW.
1. For background on the British expedition against Charleston, see Philip Schuyler to GW, 12 March, n.7.
2. British captain John Peebles wrote in his diary entry for 12 March: “a Party of 300, with arms went yesterday Eveng. & as many without went this morng. at 2 o’clock to make a Battery on the Point near the Wharff at the mouth of Waupoo, they compleat’d three embrazures & got in two 32 pors. & an 8 inch Howitzer by day light” (, 347–48; see also , 216; , 208; and 176–77).
In letters to his father, Henry, written at Charleston on 10 and 14 March, Laurens provided more specifics on recent military operations (see , 15:249–52).
3. GW’s “large map” has not been identified. In all likelihood, Laurens had left the map after visiting headquarters during the previous fall (see GW to Henry Laurens, 5 Nov. 1779, n.8; see also GW to Samuel Huntington, 29 Nov. and 2 Dec.).
The “bluff marked Bull” presumably was elevated land owned by William Bull II (1710–1791), second son of William Bull, a colonial South Carolina lieutenant governor and acting governor. The younger man served in the same capacities as his father between 1759 and 1775 and left for England in 1777. For military operations at or near land associated with Bull, who owned extensive properties, see 197, 205, 217.
In a letter to Lord George Germain written at James Island, S.C., on 9 March, Gen. Henry Clinton outlined his aims as he maneuvered his force against Charleston: “It was judged best to proceed by a second navigation from Tybee to North Edisto and from thence to pass to John’s and next to James Island by a bridge over Wappoo Cut. We have from this last gained the banks of Ashley River.
“My intention is to pass to the neck of Charleston as soon as possible. The enemy I find have collected their whole force to that place. This is said not to exceed 5000 men at present but reinforcements are daily expected. If detachments from the northward have been considerable, General Knyphausen will not fail to send me succours from New York as he has my directions to regulate himself in that particular on the motions of the enemy.
“In the meantime, as the rebels have made the defence of Charleston their principal object, I have determined on my part to assemble in greater strength before it and with this view have called immediately to this army a corps I had left in Georgia with orders by a march to Augusta to try the temper of the back settlements and draw off some opposition from this point. They will pass the Savannah River and join me by land.
“The force afloat at Charleston is 4 rebel and one French frigate, with an old 60-gun ship and some brigs and galleys.
“Although our long voyage and unavoidable delays since have given the rebels time to fortify Charleston towards the rand, a labour their numbers in Negroes has greatly facilitated, yet confiding in the merit of the troops I have the honour to command, in the great assistance I have from Earl Cornwallis and the further cooperation of the navy, I entertain great hopes of success” (, 18:53–55; see also , 160–62).
4. Laurens is referring to Capt. Abraham Whipple, who commanded a squadron of four Continental frigates from the Providence (see Benjamin Lincoln to GW, 23–24 Jan., n.3).
5. Lt. William Jennison, Jr., of the Marines apparently described the scheme in his diary entry for this date: “A plan was laid to moor boats in a line athwart the entrance of the harbor, capable of bearing a cable to bring their ships up, as they attempted to pass. Fourteen boats were procured and moored directly opposite Fort Moultrie” ( 106).
6. For the ordering of the Virginia line from Morristown to the southern department and subsequent delays in its march, see GW to Huntington, 29 Nov. 1779, and the source note to that document. This reinforcement arrived at Charleston in early April 1780 (see William Woodford to GW, 9 April).
7. Laurens had expressed a similar view when he wrote GW on 14 February.