1. Greene had started from West Point in October to take command in the southern department (see Greene to GW, 16 and 19 Oct.).

2. Greene enclosed the questions presented to a council of war held at Charlotte on 5 Dec. with Greene, Maj. Gen. William Smallwood, Brig. Gen. Isaac Huger, Col. Otho Holland Williams, and Col. Abraham Buford in attendance: “The Commanding Officer read to the council his instructions respecting the appointing a Court of Enquiry into the conduct of Major Genl Gates, during his command in this Department, and requested their opinions respectively in writing—Whether it would be practicable to hold the Court under the present circumstances of the Army, if Major Genl Baron de Steuben and another Genl Officer were here to constitute it agreeable to his instructions; and whether they would advise him to send for the Baron and another Genl Officer from Virginia untill he is more fully informed of the Enemies movements in that State, where the Baron and two other Genls belonging to the Southern Department are left with a command to watch the motions of the Enemy and to protect the State from their depredation” (DLC:GW; docketed “No. 1”; see also GW to Greene, 22 Oct., and notes 5 and 6 to that document).

Greene also enclosed copies of the responses from the attending officers, all dated 6 December. Smallwood wrote Greene that taking Major General Steuben from his command in Virginia would not “be eligible or politic … untill the Enemy’s movements and veiws there could be ascertained with more precission.” Additionally, “our situation and circumstances in a military veiw, would not admit of that delay which an enquiry of this nature might necessarily require” (DLC:GW; docketed “No. 2”).

Huger concluded his letter to Greene: “I am of opinion that were the Baron and another Genl officer here, the present situation of this Army would not admit of the court of enquiry being held; and think it would be improper under the present circumstances to call them from Virginia” (DLC:GW; docketed “No. 3”).

Williams wrote Greene that the necessity of Steuben to be in Virginia and difficulties in securing appropriate general officers to compose a court argued for postponing “an enquiry into the conduct of Major Genl Gates as Commander of the Southern Army.” Williams also worried that “the late reinforcement to Lord Cornwallis’s Army will enable him to act with such force and activity as to render the situation of yours exceedingly precarious” (DLC:GW; docketed “No. 4th”).

Buford wrote Greene: “If Major Genl Baron de Stuben was sent for, it would be practicable to make the enquiry into the conduct of Major Genl Gates as commanding officer of the Southern Army agreeable to your instructions But the present circumstances of your army, and the situation of the Enemy considered, I think it unadviseable at present to go into the enquiry. I am also of opinion that to send for the Baron for the purpose of making the enquiry would be unadvisable, untill the intentions of the enemy in the State of Virginia (where the Baron is at present) are further known; as I have reason to beleive his presence there greatly necessary there” (DLC:GW; docketed “No. 5”).

Greene wrote Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates from Charlotte on 6 Dec. that his court of inquiry would be delayed because the council of war considered it “not practicable” (Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:536).

3. See Greene’s first letter to GW of 19 Nov., and n.2 to that document.

4. Major General Steuben had written Greene from Richmond on 24 and 27–28 Nov. that military matters in Virginia improved with distressing slowness (see Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:503–4, 508–9). Steuben wrote Greene from Petersburg, Va., on 4 Dec. with information on troop preparations and intelligence: “The Enemy have undoubtedly quitted this State but it is uncertain where they are gone. It is thought to Cape Fear” (Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:523–26, quote on 525).

5. This intelligence regarding the British force that had departed from Portsmouth, Va., was erroneous (see Greene to Steuben, 22 and 27 Nov., in Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:501, 506; see also Greene to GW, 31 Oct., n.4).

6. Greene enclosed an extract from a letter Gates had written Board of War secretary Richard Peters from Hillsborough, N.C., on 23 Oct.: “Untill this campaign I was an utter ⟨s⟩tranger to the command of soldiers, without almost everything with which soldiers should be supplied. Of what use are arms without accoutrements? How can men continue in the feild in winter, without tents, or blankets? For want of cartridge boxes, belts and frogs, the ammunition and bayonets are lost, or spoiled; and the Arms rendered useless. For want of tents and blankets the men desert and die: one encreases the files of the Enemy, and both diminishes yours. Desertion, ⟨th⟩e Hospital and the grave must soon swallow ⟨u⟩p an Army thus sent into the field in Novr. I am tired of writing to Congress, to Governors, and thro them to you upon his miserable detail of wants and Deficiences. … For your own sakes consider my distress, and instantly devise means of sending to this army the supplies it cannot exist without.

“If timely measures are taken to equip the troops, they may effect something of consequence to the Southern States; but if se⟨lfish⟩ness and delay continue to impede all our m⟨ea⟩sures—what good can be expected from an Army hitherto only remarkable for its misfortunes, its perseverance, and its wants” (DLC:GW; for a transcription of the entire letter from Gates’s letterbook, see Gregory and Dunnings, “Gates Papers” description begins James Gregory and Thomas Dunnings, eds. “Horatio Gates Papers, 1726–1828.” Sanford, N.C., 1979. Microfilm. description ends ).

7. See Greene to Thomas Jefferson, 6 Dec., in Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:530–32.

8. See Greene to the North Carolina Board of War, this date, in Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:548–51.

9. Hessian recruits had sailed from New York to South Carolina (see Lafayette’s second letter to GW, 13 Nov., n.8; see also GW to Greene, 8 Nov.).

Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis had written the British commander at Charleston, Nisbet Balfour, from Winnsboro, S.C., on 30 Nov. with dispositions for troops arriving as reinforcements: “We must begin our operations by driving Gates from the frontier, which the first forward movement will instantly effect” (Saberton, Cornwallis Papers description begins Ian Saberton, ed. The Cornwallis Papers: The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in The Southern Theatre of the American Revolutionary War. 6 vols. Uckfield, England, 2010. description ends , 3:95–96). Cornwallis again wrote Balfour from Winnsboro on 5 Dec. with the observation “that Green is expected hourly to supersede Gates, but I do not think either will think of any offensive operations of consequence” (Saberton, Cornwallis Papers description begins Ian Saberton, ed. The Cornwallis Papers: The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in The Southern Theatre of the American Revolutionary War. 6 vols. Uckfield, England, 2010. description ends , 3:99).

10. See Greene to Edward Stevens, 1 Dec.; to Thaddeus Kosciuzko, 3 Dec.; and to John Thompson, 3 Dec., in Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:512–15.

11. Greene expanded on this observation when he wrote Brig. Gen. Henry Knox from Charlotte on this date: “The Word Difficulty when applied to the State of Things here, as it is used to the Northward, is almost without meaning, it falls so far Short of the real State of Things. The Inhabitants are spread over a great Extent of Country and one Family remote from the other, and not a manufactory scarcely in the whole State nor are there Tools or Artificers to be had for any Purpose whatever. … The People dont want Spirit and Enterprize, but they must go to war in their own way or not at all. Nothing can save this Country but a good permanent Army conducted with great Prudence and Caution; for the Impatience of the People to drive off the Enemy would precipitate an Officer into a Thousand Misfortunes, and the Mode of conducting the War which is most to the liking of the Inhabitants is the least likely to effect their Salvation. Every Thing here depends upon opinion, and it is equally dangerous to go forward as to stand still for if you lose the Confidence of the People you lose all Support and if you rush into Danger you hazard every Thing” (Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:547–48).

12. Greene enclosed an undated report from Col. Charles S. Myddelton on “the action which happened at Blackstock’s on Tyger River the 20th of Novr last.

“About 4 O’Clock P.M. the vedets in front apprized us of the approach of the Enemy by the discharge of their pieces. … The conflict was warm, and the Enemy were repulsed; they rallied, made a second charge and were repulsed again they made a third and our people in front were obliged to yeild to their impression but the fire from the eminence gave them such an effectual check that they quit the field in great disorder, and retired with the utmost precipitation; we ⟨purs⟩ued, but the approach of night prevented our taking any advantage of their flight—They left 92 dead and an 100 wounded on the field. The loss on our part was but very inconsiderable; only 3 killed and 4 wounded, among the latter is Genl Sumpter in the shoulder.

“The force that attacked, consisted of 300 cavalry of Tarlton’s legion 130 of the 63d and an 100 of the 71st Regiments” (DLC:GW; docketed “No. 7”). For a modern account of the combat at Blackstocks, S.C., see Boatner, Encyclopedia description begins Mark Mayo Boatner III. Encyclopedia of the American Revolution. New York, 1966. description ends , 78–80.

13. Greene enclosed a letter from Smallwood to him dated 6 Dec. that related how intelligence of Loyalists “advancing from the out posts of the British” led him to detach “Genl Morgan with 500 infantry and Lt. Col. Washington with 100 Cavalry to cover a numbers of waggons which were ordered down in that quarter after Corn and Pork—and if possible to intercept the tories.

“The enemy gaining intelligence of the advance of our troops retreated—and whilst the covering party remained on that duty—Lt Colonel Washington with the continental and some militia Horse—reduced Colo. Rugley, Major Cook and 112 tory Officers and Soldiers (in a logged Barn on Rugley’s plantation strongly secured by Abatis) to surrender at discretion without firing a shot.

“The Colonels address and stratagem deserve applause—having no Artillery, he mounted a pine-log—and holding out the appearance of an attack with Field pieces—carried his point, by sending in a flag and demanding an immediate surrender” (DLC:GW; docketed “No. 8”). Lt. Col. William Washington’s success at Rugeley’s Mills (Clermont), S.C., occurred on 4 Dec. (see Boatner, Encyclopedia description begins Mark Mayo Boatner III. Encyclopedia of the American Revolution. New York, 1966. description ends , 951).

14. Smallwood’s departure for Maryland solved the immediate problem (see Greene to Samuel Huntington, and to Steuben, both 28 Dec., in Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 7:7–12; see also Taaffe, Washington’s Generals description begins Stephen R. Taaffe. Washington’s Revolutionary War Generals. Norman, Okla., 2019. description ends , 220).

15. See Greene to GW, 3 Nov., and GW to Greene, 8 November.

16. The prisoners had been taken at Kings Mountain, S.C., on 7 Oct. (see General Orders, 27 Oct., and n.2 to that document).

17. Greene proposed a prisoner exchange when he wrote Cornwallis from Charlotte on 17 Dec. and expressed a “wish to soften the rigors of war as much as possible” (Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:591–93, quote on 592; see also Greene to John Butler, to Joseph Marbury, and to Francis Locke, all 4 Dec., in Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 6:516, 521–22). In his reply to Greene from Winnsboro on 27 Dec., Cornwallis ignored the proposal (see Greene Papers description begins Richard K. Showman et al., eds. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene. 13 vols. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976–2005. description ends , 7:5–6).

18. Greene next wrote GW on 28 December.

19. GW replied to Greene on 9–11 Jan. 1781 (MiU-C, Greene Papers; see also n.2 above; Gates to GW, 15 Jan. 1781, DLC:GW; and Nelson, General Horatio Gates description begins Paul David Nelson. General Horatio Gates: A Biography. Baton Rouge, La., 1976. description ends , 250–55).