The defense of the city and port of New York consumed the state government throughout the tenure of Jay’s governorship. The threat posed by French naval forces to New York’s vulnerable maritime trade coupled with the bitter memory of British occupation during the previous war meant that the fortification and armament of New York City remained high priority issues. Yet delays and disputes continuously plagued defensive measures as authorities and agencies at the municipal, state, and national levels squabbled over issues of land ownership, administrative jurisdiction, and resource allocation. As New York’s chief executive, Jay did his best to mediate the complex and often competing agendas of the involved parties. Despite Jay’s endeavors, difficulties nonetheless persisted that undermined his efforts to establish a comprehensive and viable defense system for New York City and its adjoining waterscape.

Before Jay held the post of governor, the previous administration under George Clinton had worked to secure New York’s harbor in the midst of a national war scare.1 As New York and much of the country braced for a seemingly imminent conflict with Britain in 1794, federal attention focused on the lack of adequate coastal fortifications along the eastern seaboard. A committee report undertaken by the House of Representatives found New York City woefully unprepared to withstand a seaborne attack, and therefore recommended erecting fortified works, mobilizing troops, and acquiring artillery pieces for the metropolis as well as Paulus Hook and Governors Island.2 The difficulty of implementing such measures was remarked upon by Washington, who noted that the defense of New York City posed a particular challenge for military engineers.3

In response, Congress passed two acts4 in March for the protection of the nation’s ports and harbors; these statutes implemented what later became known as the nation’s First System of Coastal Fortifications.5 That same month, the New York legislature supplemented the federal funding with an appropriation of thirty thousand pounds and established a seven-person committee to oversee defense preparations.6 Charles Vincent, who was appointed as temporary engineer, developed an ambitious plan for fortifying the inner and outer harbors; he called for the construction of defensive positions to cover the Narrows—the body of water separating Staten Island from Brooklyn—and also commenced an earthworks square-shaped fort on Governors Island that was later named Fort Jay in 1798.7 The heavy costs associated with labor and materials, however, hindered progress and forced Vincent and his colleagues to scale back their plans.8

The prospect of war reaching American shores receded with the signing of the Jay Treaty, and the interest in carrying out military preparations likewise diminished. When Clinton left office in June 1795, his administration left the newly elected governor a legacy of partially constructed earthworks and an insufficient number of cannon to properly defend the port. Despite the public’s curbed enthusiasm for expensive military projects, Jay advocated for their completion. In an inaugural address before the state legislature in January 1796, he laid out a comprehensive defensive agenda, contending that the nation must be prepared to “resist and repel hostilities” through the coordinated efforts of state and federal authorities.9 He then emphasized the commercial necessity of fortifying the port of New York by reminding state lawmakers that it was the sole location “through which the great mass of our exports and imports pass.”10

Throughout 1796, the planning of harbor defenses moved forward, while the actual work proceeded slowly. An early appropriations bill allocated five thousand pounds for fortifying Oyster, Bedloe’s (Bedlow’s), and Governors Islands.11 Matthew Clarkson, one of the commissioners overseeing fortifications, presented Jay with a survey of the state of defenses for the three harbor islands along with recommendations for improvement.12 Joseph François Mangin, a French architect and military engineer who had replaced Vincent as chief engineer, developed his own plan for fortifying the port.13 The state government, however, lacked the necessary resources to implement these defensive measures. The New York delegation in Congress led by Edward Livingston sought relief by requesting additional federal monies. They pointed out that the state had already laid out $200,000 for defense yet it had received only $17,522 from the national government. Jay’s hopes for federal and state cooperation were dashed as the motion was soundly defeated by a vote of 64–14. Opponents to the measure argued that no additional federal funding

Detail of “A Chart of Newyork harbour,” a map of New York Harbor defenses, date unknown. (RG 77, Fortifications Map File, Dr. 142 Sheet 92; National Archives and Records Administration)

Financial shortcomings in the following year further delayed any substantial progress on harbor defenses. When Jay learned from Philip Van Cortlandt that the House of Representatives had passed a resolution to take up the issue of fortifications in New York City, he wrote to the State Committee on Fortifications and requested that the members provide Van Cortlandt with an accurate report on the status of defensive preparations. The governor further recommended that state commissioner Ebenezer Stevens and Mangin should travel to Philadelphia to meet with members of Congress in order to influence a more favorable outcome.16 Stevens proved an ideal appointee as the commissioner already served as an agent for the Department of War. Stevens’s mission to the nation’s capital failed, however, to convince Congress to appropriate the requisite funds.17 Jay commiserated with John Williams, the representative for the state’s Ninth Congressional District, that the trickle of federal aid had dried up and “that no measures very effectual will be taken by the present Congress”.18 The setback, however, did not shake the governor’s conviction that the defensive projects were vital for the long term security of New York City and the United States. “The nation will have reason to be dissatisfied,” he confided to Williams, “if after so long an Interval of peace and Prosperity, war should find us in a defenceless state.”19

Fears of a French attack were stoked by a massive fire that struck the Wall Street area in early December 1796, and by other fires that devastated other port cities. Many frightened residents suspected arson and that pro-French saboteurs set the blazes to spread confusion and foment Jacobin terror.20 Such fears were seemingly confirmed several months later by John Clarke, a Republican sympathizer from New York, who had served aboard the French privateer La Vengeance. Clarke confessed to Jay that while serving aboard ship, he heard mention of a series of fires that had been deliberately set. More disturbing was Clarke’s confession “That the Destruction of all our sea port Towns ^and Frigates^ is mediated— [and] that a French Fort Fleet will ^is expected to co-operate with Incendiaries in that Design.”21

As tensions mounted between France and the United States during the summer of 1797, Federalists in the nation’s legislature once again took up the issue of putting American ports in a state of military preparedness. The Department of War estimated that $200,000 was needed to fulfill this objective, with nearly half of the sum earmarked to fortify the three islands located in New York’s inner harbor.22 Congress eventually allocated $115,000 for maritime fortifications located throughout the nation and permitted state governments to credit the amounts they spent on defensive measures against the debt owed to the United States.23 New York’s access to federal funding, however, was not guaranteed, due to unresolved issues over territorial jurisdiction and unpaid debt.

Expectant of federal aid, Jay wrote to Secretary of War James McHenry and enquired about how the funds for coastal defense would be divided among the respective states.24 The secretary’s response was not encouraging; sums had been provided for “indispensable Repairs to the “Banks and Fort at Mud Island [near Philadelphia]”, but no present action had been taken and no plans were yet in place to apply these funds to the defense of New York.25

Regardless of the inactivity displayed by the Department of War, Jay remained resolute in his commitment to shoring up fortifications. With negotiations between the United States and her former ally at a standstill, he perceived that the two countries were drifting towards war and that such a conflict would prove disastrous for New York. “A compleat State of Defence at Home,” he wrote to Pickering, “appears to me to be the only solid Foundation on which to rest our Hopes of Security; and I regret that more has not been done towards it.”26 Jay then touched on the issue of popular opinion regarding France, noting that the “public Reports and Letters,” such as those submitted by Pickering and other officials were instrumental in cultivating support for government policies.27

Jay’s remarks on the relationship of circulating news and mobilizing public support were borne out by developments during the spring and summer of 1798. As New Yorkers learned of the reception and treatment that the American commissioners received at the hands of Talleyrand and the Directory, their debates over improving defenses and how they would be financed took on greater urgency.28 The ensuing diplomatic uproar heightened the perceived vulnerability of New York’s port to a possible French raid or invasion. This sentiment intensified with the appearance of a congressional report on coastal fortifications showing that the Department of War had neglected the protection of New York City, while leaving a considerable amount of the allocated funds unexpended.29

State officials and private citizens in New York were dissatisfied with the national government’s response and articulated their grievances and frustrations through a flurry of resolutions, petitions, memorials, and correspondences. The New York Chamber of Commerce complained about the poor condition of the city’s defenses to the state assembly, who in turn asked for an updated status and a financial accounting from the governor.30 Seeking to comply with the Assembly’s charge, Jay contacted Commissioner Stevens, Secretary of War McHenry, and Secretary of State Pickering for advice and news. In addition, Stevens was directed to travel to the state capital and present his findings in person before the legislative session drew to a close.31 Jay also delivered a threefold message to the Assembly members: first, he promised to pass on the latest plans and estimates of harbor defenses; next, he offered reassurances that the national government recognized New York’s commercial significance and would thereby provide material and monetary assistance to secure the city and port; and finally, he suggested that the delegates remain in session until they drew up a budgetary plan for fortifications and military stores.32

Stevens did not attend the legislative session in Albany because he was, at the behest of the Chamber of Commerce, once again pleading the case for New York before federal officials in Philadelphia.33 The commissioner shared Jay’s concerns that New York City’s immense wealth and property “invite invasion” and feared that such an event would devastate state trade and national revenue. Stevens offered a sobering assessment of New York’s vulnerability, noting that the fortifications on Governors Island and elsewhere remained incomplete and that not “One piece of Ordinance fit for Service” was to be found in Manhattan. With its defenses in disarray, the city would be at the mercy of a single “Twenty Gun privateer”. In a telling admission, he hinted that this crisis arose because no clear policy had been established for assigning and coordinating defensive duties. Due to this defect within the federal system of governance, Stevens observed that “it is to be apprehended that the reciprocal reliance on each other which exists on the part of the United States and of this State, arising from circumstances which it is unnecessary to mention, will be the means of preventing either from paying that Attention which is necessary to the defence of this important place”.34

The subsequent report submitted by Stevens along with another sent by Congressman Livingston did little to assuage Jay’s fear that there would be no federal grants for fortifications. Stevens had spoken with both the congressional Committee for the Protection of Commerce and the Defence of the Country and with President Adams. Although the former had assured him that the existing proviso mandating land cessions would be repealed, the president had insisted that he would not recommend that New York receive twenty thousand dollars for military arms and equipment until it agreed to hand over the disputed properties to the United States.35 Livingston confirmed Stevens’s evaluation, passing on the unwelcome news that New York City would in all likelihood not be a beneficiary of an upcoming appropriations bill for coastal defenses.36

As funding for New York appeared inextricably linked with ceding territorial jurisdiction, the state legislature took what it hoped would prove an important step in defusing the issue. In early April, lawmakers passed a measure authorizing a commission, comprised of the governor, lieutenant-governor, chancellor, chief justice of the state supreme court, and mayor of New York City, to enforce land cessions on Staten Island and the nearby harbor islands to the United States for the purpose of securing the city and port.37 The governor wasted little time in informing McHenry of this development and asked the secretary of war which “particular Spots or Parcels of Ground the United States would prefer for these Purposes.”38

Congress spent two days in April debating the issue of fortifying ports before passing a bill on 3 May.39 The law appropriated $250,000 for defenses, but did not specify how the amount would be divided among the different locations. The bill repealed the requirement that states must relinquish the property upon which the fortified positions were built, while allowing those indebted to the federal government to be issued a credit for the amount they spent on defensive projects.40

While Congress passed its defense bill, the citizens of New York City developed their own initiatives to insure the safety of their community. A committee from the local Chamber of Commerce, which included Ebenezer Stevens, penned a memorial to the Common Council asking for the sum of $40,000 to be raised to supply the city with “18 or 20 heavy Cannon mounted on field Carriages.” The committee had considered raising this sum through a “private Contribution,” but rejected this option on the grounds that it would place “unequal berthens” on a few private citizens “while the whole of the Community reap the benefit.” The Common Council advised the governor to request additional federal support from President Adams. Specifically, the Council desired that an executive order be issued that would requisition artillery pieces held at West Point for the city’s defense.41 Mayor Richard Varick sent the Council’s memorial and resolution to Jay, who in turn forwarded the documents to the secretary of war. The governor added a reminder to McHenry of the state’s commitment to the populace, observing that “if it be desirable that the people should look up to the National Government for protection, it certainly is equally desirable that they should not be disappointed.42

Most New Yorkers by this time approved of measures designed to improve the safety of their persons and property. The intense partisanship that shaped local debates over the militia and other military matters were largely absent when it came to fortifications.43 Although rare, dissenting voices were not entirely silent. For instance, Varick commented that the recent memorial presented by the Chamber of Commerce was met “with a very cold Reception and some unfriendly Remarks” by Jacob De La Montagnie, an alderman and Republican.44 Nor was the governor immune from public criticism. During the reelection campaign of 1798, a piece appearing in a Republican-leaning newspaper accused Jay and fellow-Federalist Commissioner James Watson of displaying incompetence and mismanaging the defensive duties assigned to them. The anonymous writer further leveled an implicit charge of cowardice against the governor, by noting that Jay, a commissioned militia officer, had fled from the enemy to Kent, Connecticut, during the Revolutionary War.45

Jay refused to publicly respond to such allegations, and he also avoided openly condemning Republicans for blocking the progress of New York’s defenses. Nonetheless, his personal correspondence did contain several rebukes against the New York legislature. In a letter to Varick, the governor criticized state lawmakers for not following his earlier advice that they remain sitting in session until a defensive budget was successfully drawn up.46 Jay’s communications with Stevens further reveal his frustration with the state legislature. This body, he complained to the commissioner, lacked a “serious disposition” and therefore had missed an opportunity to lay out efficient plans for financing and constructing New York’s defenses.47 The recent law passed by the legislature to build a state arsenal was likewise censured by Jay who accused the bill’s supporters of allocating insufficient sums for the project and of relying too heavily on future funding.48 Jay completed his critique with a warning that “untill we become more united in our Councils, and less influenced by Considerations in which the public has little Interest, our affairs will not be wisely managed.”49

Stevens concurred with Jay’s assessment that the legislature’s misconduct and lack of action would demoralize the populace. He therefore encouraged the governor to journey from Albany, which had been designated as the state capital in 1797, to the threatened port city.50 Such a move would allay the general mood of anxiety that gripped New York City. “Visit us,” Stevens urged, as “we are without a leader, or head, to step forward and purpose vigorous exertions”.51 Stevens also advised that Jay directly contact Adams and other officials in Philadelphia about committing funds for New York fortifications. Stevens had already spoken with the “Heads of the Departments on military matters,” but he insisted that “your writing would have the most effect, and would be most likely to accomplish the end.”52 The governor, however, had already contacted McHenry weeks earlier, seeking information on the status of federal grants.53 The Secretary assured Jay that the security of New York was “important to the union,” but stopped short of offering concrete support. McHenry then reminded Jay that the War Department had received several “varied calls of the same Nature, each important and claiming attention.”54

Each faltering effort by the government to secure New York City was now met with growing discontent by the local populace. In early June, the citizenry took matters into its own hands by organizing several committees with a collective design to pressure state and federal officials to commit more resources and energy to fortifying New York’s port and harbor. Committees representing New York’s seven wards, along with a Committee from the Chamber of Commerce, and a delegation of military officers who had served in the revolutionary war, assembled at City Hall on 8 June. Commissioner Matthew Clarkson presided over the proceedings as participants appointed Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr, and Ebenezer Stevens to the Military Committee, a three-person board responsible for overseeing local defensive arrangements.55

As representatives of New York’s civic committees, Clarkson and the Military Committee lacked formal authority, but this circumstance did not stop them from galvanizing both those in political office as well as the general populace to action. Less than a week after the gathering at City Hall, Clarkson passed on the meeting’s agenda to the Common Council. The Council responded that same day with a resolution calling for a loan of $50,000 for the city’s defenses.56 The Military Committee also consulted with the secretary of war when he traveled to New York City in mid-June for the purpose of surveying the harbor. McHenry asked the members for advice on the specific placement of batteries and whether an outer ring of defenses centered on Sandy Hook and the Narrows would be preferable to the current plan of fortifying the islands in the inner harbor.57 Later that month, the joint committees held another meeting and passed a resolution urging residents to assist with defensive efforts by registering for volunteer labor in their respective wards. Those suffering from “bodily indisposition” had the option of contributing ten shillings as payment for “procuring persons to perform such parts of the duty as may require instruction and practice.”58 Peter Augustus Jay informed his friend in early July that volunteers had nearly finished constructing a battery designed for some forty to fifty artillery pieces and further remarked upon the “Spirit of Resistance” that New Yorkers now displayed against the French enemy.59

In addition to these measures, Clarkson wrote to the governor urging him to convene an early session of the state legislature so that lawmakers could take up the work of New York’s fortifications.60 Whereas Jay conceded the merit of Clarkson’s recommendation, he nonetheless refrained from taking immediate action. Such an important decision, Jay insisted, required that he first travel southward and personally assess the state of defenses and plans for their improvement. Moreover, Jay contended that it would be premature for the legislators to debate the issue of fortifications before McHenry had even presented his findings to Congress and other federal officials.61 With a mind to coordinate the various defensive efforts of the governmental and nongovernmental agencies, Jay forwarded his correspondence with Clarkson to Varick and requested that the mayor and the Common Council share their views on the measures proposed by the civic committees.62 The Council responded with a resolution endorsing an early convening of the state legislature. The Council members further resolved to explore the feasibility of raising more funds for defense, and declared that “the essential Interests of the Community, induce them to unite with the Committee of the Citizens”.63

After much deliberation, the governor concluded that the ongoing diplomatic crisis left him little choice but to employ his executive authority and order an early meeting of the state legislature. Accordingly, on 2 July, Jay issued an official proclamation instructing the members of New York’s Assembly and Senate to convene for a special session in Albany on 9 August.64 In his speech before the legislature, Jay warned of an impending conflict with France and raised the suggestion that the assembled lawmakers should implement a new taxation scheme to help cover the expense of fortifying New York City.65

Jay’s calls for legislative action did not fall on deaf ears. On 27 August, lawmakers passed a bill that appropriated $150,000 for repairing and completing fortifications on Manhattan, Governors Island, Bedloe’s Island, Oyster Island, and Long Island. Jay was now empowered to directly appoint subordinates who would plan and oversee the construction of fortified works. The team that Jay assembled included experienced individuals like Ebenezer Stevens, who would serve as superintendent of fortifications, Matthew Clarkson, who would assist with financial matters, and Joseph F. Mangin, who would continue as the City’s chief engineer. These three officials would report directly to Alexander Hamilton, who in addition to serving as Inspector General of the American army, would soon take on the responsibilities of directing New York’s military in concert with Jay.66

The new law therefore granted the governor a good deal of authority over defensive matters, yet it also called for close coordination with the president of the United States and his advisors. Whereas Jay bore responsibility for sanctioning the defensive plans to be devised and implemented, he could only authorize the expenditure of funds pending approval from Adams, and therefore needed to consult with Hamilton, the designated federal appointee in charge of supervising harbor fortifications.67 The resulting arrangement by which the state monies allocated for New York City’s defenses were managed by the national government presented local, state, and federal officials with potential disputes over administrative authority and financial resources. Even Hamilton, ever wary of his public reputation, expressed misgivings about taking on such a delicate position. Adams sought to overcome feelings of mistrust and potential conflict by assuring Jay that his administration would not overstep its jurisdiction and would work in close cooperation with New York authorities in matters of defensive preparation.68

Whereas the unfolding events of the XYZ affair intensified sectarian divisiveness and rancor in New York City, the efforts to build up harbor defenses during the summer of 1798 offered a notable exception to this trend. Most local Federalist and Republican leaders set aside their political differences and cooperated on resolving the problems of inadequate fortifications and insufficient armament. For instance, rivals Aaron Burr and Alexander Hamilton served together on the recently formed Military Committee. Burr had already chaired a five-person committee in the state assembly that reported on the budget for New York’s defense, and he continued to mobilize his colleagues in support of appropriations by working alongside the City’s Military Committee.69 He even traveled to the nation’s capital to promote the cause of New York’s defenses before federal officials.70 In this capacity, Burr acted as an effective liaison, coordinating efforts between civic groups in New York City, the state legislature and governor’s office in Albany, and the national government in Philadelphia. Hamilton had such great faith in Burr’s ability to oversee fortifications that he recommended Burr to serve as his successor as superintendent of harbor defenses.71

In late October, Jay laid out a course of action for Hamilton and his fellow appointees. He first called for a thorough and accurate survey of the port to be followed by a drafting of plans of fortified positions. Jay urged his subordinates to work quickly so that the defensive proposals could be submitted for approval by the president and the secretary of war before the next meeting of the state legislature in January.72

To facilitate the survey’s completion, Jay directed Clarkson to cover related expenses by drawing on the Bank of New York for the amount of $500 and instructed Hamilton to coordinate with Clarkson, Burr, and Stevens on the subsequent plans for fortifications.73 Jay expressed a desire to attend the proceedings, but “An unexpected and painful Complaint (the Piles)” prevented him from leaving Albany for New York City. Jay further excused his absence with an admission that he lacked a firm understanding of military science and would therefore rely on the judgement of those possessing technical expertise.74

In addition to providing funds for the construction of fortified works, the recent defense bill also made a generous allowance for procuring and storing artillery, small arms, and munitions.75 The shortage of weaponry and military stores had plagued the state’s defense efforts since Jay first came to the governor’s office. In his opening address before the state legislature in January 1796, Jay quoted New York’s Constitution on the necessity of maintaining a “proper magazine of warlike stores” and spoke of ending the state’s dependence on foreign sources of weaponry by encouraging the growth of domestic arms manufacturing.76

By the fall of 1798, Jay recognized that the state’s scarcity of weapons and war materials could not be resolved without overseas assistance.77 He contacted Rufus King, the American minister to Britain, with a request that King contract for muskets to equip the New York militia.78 Although the weapons were not available from British sources, less expensive muskets “made on the English model” could be had from sources in Hamburg. Joseph Pitcairn, the American consul in Hamburg, would make the purchasing arrangements for “Three thousand Muskets with Steel ram rods and Bayonets.”79 That spring Jay instructed King to place the order and also directed Matthew Clarkson to handle the financial transactions in New York, allotting $10,000 to cover the costs of a thousand stands of arms with the remainder to be paid at a later date.80 Pitcairn successfully negotiated for 2,500 muskets with accoutrements at the rate of twenty-six shillings and six pence per stand of arms and arranged for the cargo to be transported by the American ship Prosper and the Danish ship Margaretha Elizabeth.81 The two vessels sailed from the port of Hamburg with the Prosper arriving in New York in August and the Margaretha Elizabeth in October 1799.82 Stevens reported that the arms had rusted from an exposure to salt water during the voyage, but he reassured the governor that this damage could be repaired at minimal cost.83

Finding small arms to defend New York no longer posed a problem for Jay, but he still faced the difficulty of financing the city and harbor defenses. The implementation of fortification plans submitted by Hamilton and his subordinates stalled because the recent defense bill lacked adequate provisions for resolving matters of monetary requests, transfers, and reimbursements. For instance, Stevens informed Hamilton in late November 1798 that Mangin was awaiting payment for his engineering services and that many of the hired laborers and tradesmen also required compensation. Stevens further mentioned that the devastating impact of the yellow fever epidemic upon the local economy made it imperative to pay employees in a timely manner.84

The Military Committee and the Corporation of New York City frequently called upon the governor to help settle the financial problems they encountered arising from defense expenditures. When the city of New York exceeded its summer budget of $50,000 for fortifications, Mayor Richard Varick contacted Jay for assistance, pleading that “there must be a new provision by law to relieve us.”85 Lawmakers in Albany, however, could offer little relief as they first had to decide whether to accept the federal funding offered in a recent Congressional bill. The terms of the bill stated that the sums expended on defensive appropriations would be used to pare down the debt that New York owed the United States and included the provision that the places of fortification must be ceded to the federal government.86 The legislature delayed making a decision, however, even though Jay warned the state senate in March 1799 that continued deliberation would cause “embarrassments” to President Adams.87

Without the benefit of further federal assistance and with defense costs running over budget, the legislature voted in April to stop work on existing and new fortifications and to remit funds for any outstanding expenses incurred by these same projects.88 In the months following this legislation, Hamilton reported that progress on the defensive works “proceeds heavily” and inquired about the availability of additional state funding.89 Several mechanics and laborers remained unpaid, and Stevens warned that he “should not be surprized should they one & all commence a suit against me.”90

The passage of two pieces of state legislation in February and March 1800 revitalized the efforts to secure the city and harbor of New York. After months of wavering over whether they should comply with federal statutes, state lawmakers finally ceded Bedloe’s, Governors, and Oyster Islands to the United States and approved a $20,000 appropriation to be spent on fortifications over the next five years.91 Jay welcomed these developments, commenting to Clarkson that “The unavoidable Delays which have retarded the measures to be taken for fortifying the port of New York are I hope now at an end.”92 The governor envisioned setting up an administrative apparatus for overseeing defense matters similar to the one established some two years earlier. He would seek the approval of President Adams and Samuel Dexter, the new Secretary of War, for major proposals, while state and local officials would closely coordinate with federal authorities on the placement and construction of fortifications.93 Seeking trusted subordinates to continue the project, the governor tapped Stevens to purchase materials, hire laborers, and superintend the work, and asked Clarkson to take charge of the financial accounts.94 For the role of chief engineer, Jay followed the advice of Samuel Dexter and selected Jean Xavier Bureaux de Puzy, a French émigré politician who had served on Lafayette’s staff.95

Yet Jay’s enthusiasm was misplaced. As his tenure in office drew to a close, the prospect of making significant progress toward the completion of fortifications grew increasingly remote. The recent defense initiatives outlined by the governor were not fully implemented, and Hamilton, Stevens, and Clarkson—his trusted and experienced colleagues—were worn down by fatigue and frustration and expressed doubt that they would continue in their duties. Clarkson pointed out to Jay the difficulties of working within a complex bureaucratic system while being deprived of just compensation. Clarkson also revealed his concern that rumors were circulating of Jay’s imminent retirement. If the governor did not intend to seek another term in public office, Clarkson avowed that he would step down from his post.96 Moreover, by late 1800, the threat of a French assault on New York City and the American seaboard had diminished considerably with ongoing negotiations and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Mortefontaine. While the construction of harbor defenses never entirely ceased, state lawmakers now saw little advantage to be gained by appropriating funds for defensive measures amid this shifting political climate.