Militia Matters in New York State: Editorial Note
Militia Matters in New York State
New York had fielded a militia since colonial times and continued to rely on this institution as the state’s primary military force during Jay’s governorship. Whereas Washington, Hamilton, Pickering, and other Federalist leaders favored a more permanent and centralized military akin to a standing army, the Whiggish fear that such a force posed a fundamental threat to republican liberty ushered in an American military system based on a series of state militias and a small standing army, with both federal and state authorities exerting control over militia forces.1 The individual states managed the daily affairs—organization, armament, discipline—of their respective militias during peacetime, and the Constitution of 1787 granted Congress the power to mobilize these troops for federal service in times of invasion and insurrection.2 The 1792 Militia Acts further cemented the central place of the state forces within the nation’s military establishment.3
New York’s constitution called for the existence of an active militia, in peacetime as well as in war, that was to “be armed and disciplined, and in readiness for service.”4 The state required militia service of able-bodied white men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five and expected them to provide their own firearms and accoutrements, attend unit musters, and subject themselves to military justice. Two types of units filled out the ranks of the state militia—common militiamen and volunteer corps; the former served mostly as infantry, and the latter fulfilled more specialized roles in grenadier, light infantry, rifle companies, cavalry and dragoon troops, and artillery batteries.5 All of these militia units served within one of four territorial divisions—Southern, Middle, Eastern, and Western—that were created to correspond with the state’s administrative districts.6 In addition to mustering for company and regimental exercises three times a year, the troops were called upon for inspections, drills, and marches on civic holidays and special occasions.
As governor and commander-in-chief, Jay recognized that the militia of New York, along with those of her sister states, provided the nation’s defensive foundation.7 In an opening address before the state legislature in January 1798, Jay called upon lawmakers to do their duty and improve upon the existing militia laws, reminding them, “The maxim that every nation ought to be constantly prepared for self-defence, is founded on the experience of all ages.”8 Shortly thereafter in a letter to one of New York’s congressional delegates, Jay expressed support for a new militia bill, remarking that “The Nation should take care of itself, and by its own acts do whatever (within the Limits of the Constitution) may be necessary to the National Welfare.”9 He therefore sought to ensure that New York’s militiamen were properly equipped, trained, and organized, and that they were led by proficient and reliable officers. In his first address delivered before the state legislature, Jay emphasized the correlation between national security and a well-regulated militia and prodded lawmakers to reexamine and improve upon the existing militia laws so that they complied with federal regulations.10 His endeavors to institute reforming measures such as this one rarely went unchallenged, however, as a host of political, structural, and administrative obstacles threatened to derail the governor’s vision of establishing the militia as a cohesive and effective defensive force.
The intense partisanship of New York politics that arose in response to events of the mid-1790s—the Whiskey Rebellion, Jay’s recent treaty with Britain, and the radicalization of the French Revolution—adversely affected Jay’s plans for improving the state militia.11 A number of the volunteer companies formed throughout New York were defined by the ethnic composition and the political allegiance of their membership. The governor expressed concern that such affiliations posed a danger to the young republic in their capacity to promote Jacobin ideology and thereby undermine bonds of social unity and national loyalty. The episode involving the short-lived Hibernian Volunteers of New York City underscores Jay’s anxiety that militia units were susceptible to radical politics. Founded in January 1796 by young men of Irish lineage, the New York Hibernian Volunteers swore “to assist in the defence and Protection of the United States and its Constitution & Laws, against all enemies whether Foreign or Domestic.”12 The unit disbanded some two months later, ostensibly due to a disagreement with the governor over the company’s designated uniform, which included a grass green short coat decorated with a shamrock on the facings and a helmet ornamented with an Irish harp alongside an American eagle.13 Whereas Jay disapproved of the uniform’s color and emblems, he had other reasons for not supporting the Hibernian Volunteers who wished to enroll in the state militia. Despite the loyalty oath taken by the members, the governor was undoubtedly alarmed by the prospect that the Volunteers were actually an extension of the United Irishmen movement and fearful that the true objective of the company was to incite violence and espouse radicalism in New York City.14
The politicization of the militia remained an issue that rankled Jay for much of his tenure in office. The militia as an institution, he believed, should remain strictly apolitical and refrain from expressing any partisan notions, whether in favor of Federalists or Republicans. For instance, in May 1798, the officers of the militia brigade for New York City and County convened for the purpose of sending an address to President Adams in support of his measures against French aggressions. The governor learned of this event from his son, Peter Augustus, who served as an officer in the brigade.15 Peter Augustus chose not to attend the meeting because he deemed it inappropriate that his fellow officers should “undertake in our Military Capacity to control, condemn, or even approve the Measures of the Government or any particular Branch of it.”16 Jay shared his son’s assessment that it was wrong for the assembled militiamen to delve into political affairs.17
Politics turned personal during Jay’s reelection bid when an Albany newspaper inserted a letter that assailed him for lacking the fortitude required of a military leader.18 Prominent among the denunciations was the claim that the governor had committed an act of cowardice some twenty years earlier in failing to “defend his country” against British soldiers who attacked and destroyed the town of Esopus [Kingston], New York, in 1777.19 Such behavior reflects poorly on “the character of the Captain General of our militia,” the author asserted, further warning readers that “[Y]our towns may be burned—your country desolated” if another such invasion occurred under Jay’s current leadership.20
The selection of militia officers proved another controversial issue that beset Jay’s administration. New York’s governor shared the power of naming officers and assigning ranks with the Council of Appointment.21 The passage of federal statutes that expanded the nation’s armed forces and the corresponding need for institutional reform at the state level, however, hindered Jay’s ability to effectively manage militia matters. Longstanding military customs further challenged the governor’s authority by calling into question the process and legitimacy of formal militia appointments.
Jay and his colleagues therefore had to deliberate carefully over how they awarded commissions and granted promotions. Such decisions were made more difficult due to the fact that officers’ commissions were highly prized items in the honor-obsessed milieu of Federalist New York. Being named as an officer in the state militia was a distinction sought by many, for it publicly affirmed one’s reputation as a trustworthy and virtuous citizen. Even with the expansion of the officer corps during the Quasi-War, there remained more candidates than postings, and those passed over for commissions and promotions often complained of unfair treatment by the governor and the state apparatus. For instance, in the spring of 1798, Jay wrote to Melanchton Lloyd Woolsey, a former lieutenant-colonel who had served in Clinton County, asking him to return to militia service. Woolsey had recently resigned his commission upon learning that one of his leading subordinates had lost out on a promotion to an officer whom Woolsey believed to be less deserving.22
The problems associated with officer seniority and appointments proved more than a minor irritant involving one or two individuals. In the spring of 1797, the officers of the elite Regiment of Artillery for the City and County of New York threatened to resign en masse over the refusal of the state government to promote their commanding officer, Sebastian Bauman, to the rank of brigadier general.23 In a pair of memorials sent to the governor the previous year, the officers laid out their arguments in favor of Bauman’s advancement, explaining that they could not abide for an officer of lesser seniority to be promoted over him. This action, the officers protested, set a dangerous precedent of disallowing any of them to rise above the rank of lieutenant colonel. The memorialists expressed confidence that the government would resolve the affair according to the “principles of private and official honor,” but warned that they would quit the Artillery Regiment if their grievances were not redressed.24 The governor counselled patience, informing the officers that a recently passed militia law25 called for artillery and cavalry units to be formed into their own brigades and promised that this matter would soon receive his full attention.26 At a meeting held at Hunter’s Hotel in early May, members of the Regiment of Artillery agreed not to resign their posts before lawmakers had an opportunity to devise a solution at the subsequent legislative session.27 The officers then sent a third memorial to Jay in early January 1797 proposing that artillerymen should have same system of promotion as their counterparts in the infantry.28 Jay forwarded the message to legislators in Albany along with a personal note urging them to revise the militia laws.29 The reform measure stalled in committee, however, as state lawmakers opted to wait for the passage of a new congressional militia bill before taking further action.30 Disappointed that they had not received proper satisfactions through official channels, Bauman and his fellow officers tendered their resignations that spring.31 They also compiled several documents related to the affair into a printed pamphlet with the intent of justifying their conduct before the court of public opinion.
The Bauman episode created a dilemma for state officials. Without a commandant or subordinate officers, the Regiment of Artillery would lack a viable command structure and therefore be incapable of performing its defensive duties. Fearful that such a situation would render New York City and its port more vulnerable to maritime attack, the Council of Appointment devised a solution to avoid the lengthy process of appointing a new set of officers. Accordingly, the council refused the proffered resignations; only Bauman stepped down as commandant while the other officers were persuaded to remain at their posts.32
Finding a suitable replacement for Bauman proved a more difficult prospect. The post was offered on at least two occasions to Ebenezer Stevens, who had considerable experience serving with artillery units during the war of independence and who was currently in charge of procuring ordinance and supplies for the state artillery.33 Jay urged Stevens to accept the appointment, noting that in the likelihood of a conflict with France, the public depended on the artillery for protection. Moreover, Stevens had previously drawn up plans for expanding and reorganizing the Artillery Regiment and was the governor’s chosen man for carrying them out.34 Stevens made clear that he could not command the officers who remained with the regiment because they resented “the Idea of being superseded” and he did not think it proper to “hurt their feelings.”35 Instead of serving as colonel for the regiment, Stevens suggested that an entirely new corps of artillerymen be raised in New York City and placed under his command. To strengthen the bonds of loyalty and camaraderie among the ranks, Stevens further recommended that members should be permitted to elect the remaining officers.36 Although Steven’s proposal had the backing of many local citizens, the governor doubted that his measure would receive legislative support, observing that the issue of whether militiamen should vote for their superiors was not “free from doubt.“37
Stevens eventually relented and agreed to assume command of the Regiment of Artillery. He could not in good conscience refuse to serve when “all his fellow Citizens are anxious” that he do so.38 Stevens acknowledged that his earlier refusal to lead the Artillery Regiment was essentially a matter of honor that dated back to the formation of the unit in the previous decade. Stevens explained that he had tried without success to serve as its first commandant, asserting that due to his seniority in rank, the appointment should have been rightfully his. Although Philip Schuyler and Alexander Hamilton had both supported his claim, Governor Clinton had seen fit to pass him over in favor of Bauman. Stevens confessed to Jay that this rough treatment at the hands of the state government had “wounded my military pride.”39 Stevens’s honor would now be restored by his new command and by an act of the state legislature that passed a few weeks thereafter. In addition to doubling the size of the Artillery Regiment so that it contained eight companies organized into two battalions, the bill conveyed the rank of brevet brigadier general upon the regimental commandant.40
With the prospect of a Franco-American conflict seeming ever more likely, Adams and other statesmen recognized the need to augment the nation’s militia forces and make them more combat effective. In June 1797, Congress authorized the creation of a rapid deployment force of eighty thousand militiamen, with New York responsible for supplying 7,923 troops.41 The following year, legislators in Philadelphia approved the formation of a Provisional Army, an additional militarized force numbering ten thousand men.42 Lawmakers anticipated that the quotas imposed by the recent legislation would be met through the raising of volunteer companies in communities throughout the United States. In response to the latter law, a host of new military units arose in New York City and throughout the state.43 James Watson remarked on this phenomenon to Jay: “It will occur to your Excellency that the volunteer companies, of all descriptions, now forming are composed of persons respectable for their property, understanding, and virtues. Formed into a Legion under good Commanders they will always be found ready to defend their County, its liberties, and laws.”44
The governor advised that more reform measures were needed to accommodate the incoming companies and he played an active role in determining which units would be accepted into New York’s militia establishment and whether they should be unified in a single corps.45 In these matters, he consulted regularly with Alexander Hamilton, who oversaw the defenses of New York City, Matthew Clarkson, who commanded the southern division of the state militia, and James M. Hughes, who led the Brigade for the City and County of New York.46
The formation of several new companies in the Spring and Summer of 1798 once again raised the question of how would their command structure be organized.47 Peter Augustus informed his father that many local militia officers were distressed by the rumor that the governor intended to staff a new regiment with officers who had no previous command experience.48
This issue proved particularly divisive in New York City where the brigade commanded by Hughes clashed with the newer volunteer companies over the awarding of commissions. The volunteer militiamen expected that they would be able to elect their officers, while members of the regular militia preferred the promotion of officers who had seniority of service.49 Peter Augustus reported that the brigade officers were contemplating whether they should contact the Council of Appointment “on the Subject of the proposed nomination of persons to Captains Commissions who are now in the Ranks.”50 The governor and the Council of Appointment tended to uphold the system that allowed new companies to choose their own leaders. Hamilton pointed out this method of appointment created greater cohesion within the unit, even asserting that “To attempt to place them under the present Militia officers is to annihilate them.”51 Hamilton further ventured that the militia officers who voiced opposition were in fact part of an “antifederal scheme” intended to discredit the government and that they “can easily be replaced, with as good or better” if they chose to resign in protest.52
Whereas the governor shared Watson’s optimism that the rise in volunteers reflected the patriotic and respectable sentiment of New Yorkers, Jay also shared Hamilton’s apprehension that Republican operatives would exploit the expansion of the militia to their political advantage. As he had with the Hibernian Volunteers, Jay probably played a role in disbanding the Washington Infantry, a volunteer company raised in the summer of 1798 for men of Irish heritage. Soon after their formation, the Washington Infantry suffered a double blow with the troops decimated by yellow fever and the officers refused commissions by the Council of Appointment.53 Other potential threats materialized that summer. Jay heard of “a new company of Democrats” forming in the city that had elected Edward Ferris, a “dramshop” owner, as their commanding officer. Ferris had allegedly declared that if the French invaded the city, he would join with the enemy.54 Although Ferris seems ultimately not to have received a commission, other men who were deemed as politically unsuited were successful militia appointees. William Whitehead, a cabinetmaker, was one such figure. In the spring of 1798, Whitehead received a lieutenancy and commanded the Rising Sun Company of the Second Regiment of New York City, a unit known for its Republican sympathies.55 Whitehead’s political credentials, which included posts within the local Democratic Society, Tammany Society, and the General Society of Mechanic and Tradesmen, furthered the suspicions of Brigade officers who favored Federalist policies.56 Even the Artillery Regiment formerly commanded by Bauman was affected by partisan mistrust; Peter Augustus remarked that the unit was severely understrength due to its being led by “Jacobinical Officers.”57
Evidence of militia partisanship extended beyond New York City. The governor received reports from Peter Augustus that the recent military appointments in nearby Westchester County were causing unease among local officials. At least half of the militia officers, including those who would soon be appointed to Micajah Wright’s recently established Troop of Horse, were described as “disaffected” and of harboring Republican sentiments.58 Indeed, these anxieties seemed well founded, as Jay’s son informed him shortly thereafter that “one of the most violent Jacobins in the County” had been commissioned as a coronet in Wright’s Troop.59 At times, Peter would offer advice to his father on those officers in the Westchester militia who were politically reliable and deserving of promotion.60
Maintaining discipline among the militia troops was an ongoing problem during Jay’s administration. Those enlisted personnel and officers who engaged in improper behavior were commonly punished with fines or had their commissions revoked. Even generals were not immune from obeying military regulations; for instance, Patrick Campbell, who led a militia brigade in Herkimer County, was removed from command in March 1797 after being found to be “intemperate and inattentive to the duties of his said office.”61 The influx of volunteers the following year made it much more difficult to uphold disciplinary standards. When the Council of Appointment learned that a company of light infantry from Westchester County had frequently not appeared for their parade inspections, it responded by dissolving the unit and revoking the officers’ commissions.62 The frequency of such incidents alarmed the governor and persuaded him to issue a call for revising New York’s military code.63 At Jay’s urging, state lawmakers passed a militia bill that forbade the sale of alcohol at musters, established court-martials for dereliction of duty, and imposed stiff fines upon those found guilty.64
1. The nation’s regular military forces were reorganized in 1796 from the Legion of the United States to the United States Army, which was limited to 3,359 men. The creation of the Additional Army in July 1798 expanded the regular army to 14,421 men. “An Act to ascertain and fix the Military Establishment of the United States,” 30 May 1796, , 1: 483–86; David A. Clary and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, The Inspectors General of the United States Army: 1777–1903 (Washington D.C., 1987), 69; “An Act to augment the Army of the United States, and for other purposes,” 16 July 1798, , 1: 604–6. For an overview of Federalist thought regarding the roles of the militia and a standing army, see Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802 (New York and London, 1975).
2. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8.
3. “An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions,” and “An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States,” 2 and 8 May 1792, , 1: 264–65, and 271–74. These statutes were updated three years later with “An Act to provide for calling for the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and to repeal the Act now in force for that purpose,” 28 Feb. 1795, , 1: 424–25.
4. : 14.
5. Lyle D. Brundage, “The Organization, Administration, and Training of the United States Ordinary and Volunteer Militia, 1792–1861,” (Ph.D. Diss.: Univ. of Michigan, 1958), 22.
6. An act, to organize the militia of this state. Passed the 9th of March, 1793 (New York, [1793]; , series 1, no. 25897); “An Act to organize the Militia of this State,” 9 Mar. 1793, : 58–68. New York’s militia was reorganized in 1799 to five divisions. “An Act further to amend the Laws relative to the Militia of this State,” 30 Mar. 1799, N.Y. State Laws, 22nd sess., 2nd meeting, 739–47.
7. JJ may have had brief experience commanding troops as a militia officer during the war of independence, being appointed a colonel of the 2nd New York City Militia Regiment in 1775. Militia Commission of John Jay, 3 Nov. 1775, D, NNC (EJ: 07361). During the ratification debates held in Poughkeepsie during the summer of 1788, JJ argued against a proposed amendment that sought to limit the federal government’s authority over the state militia. See the editorial note “John Jay at the New York Ratifying Convention,” and Extract from Melancton Smith’s Notes of Debates, [21 July 1788], , 5: 10, 50.
8. JJ’s Address to the New York State Legislature, 2 Jan. 1798, below.
10. JJ’s Address to the New York State Legislature, 6 Jan. 1796, above.
Lawmakers responded by passing a bill that offered inducements to those who enrolled in volunteer companies, established a uniform court martial system for them, and created a means of payment for their “necessary equipments, music and cloathing.” “An Act to amend the Act entitled An Act to organize the Militia of the state,” 11 Apr. 1796, , 51–52, quote on 52; Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 18 Apr.; Greenleaf’s New York Journal, 19 Apr.; Albany Gazette, 2 May; Mohawk Mercury (Schenectady), 3 May 1796.
11. For an overview of how these events shaped the political climate of New York and the nation, see Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism.
12. .
13. Ibid.
14. JJ wrote to TP on 21 Dec. 1798, below, warning of the threat posed by the United Irishmen to New York.
15. As an officer, PAJ enjoyed a rapid rise in the militia ranks. He was appointed as an ensign in Jacob Morton’s 3rd Regiment in April 1796, and then promoted to lieutenant two years later. PAJ aspired to hold a joint appointment as adjutant in a legion of light troops that was being organized in the spring of 1799. Soon thereafter, he was serving as one of the adjutants for Morton’s 6th Regiment, a new militia formation, and quickly advanced to the rank of captain in Hughes’s Brigade. In this unit, he served as brigade major and inspector. Daily Advertiser (New York), 19 Apr. 1796; Commission for PAJ, 11 Apr. 1798, PtDS, NNC (EJ: 12776); Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 21 May 1798; PAJ to JJ, 10 Apr. 1799, ALS, NNC (EJ: 06079); JJ to PAJ, 15 Apr. 1799, ALS, NYKaJJH (EJ: 09983); JJ to PAJ, 26 June 1799, ALS, NYKaJJH (EJ: 09984); New-York Gazette, 13 July 1799; Albany Centinel, 19 July 1799; , 1: 357, 450, 489, 538.
16. PAJ to JJ, 13 May 1798, below.
17. JJ to PAJ, 17 May 1798, below.
18. Albany Register, 20 Apr. 1798. See the editorial note “John Jay wins Reelection as Governor in 1798,” below.
19. Albany Register, 20 Apr. 1798. For more on this episode, see the editorial note “Defending New York,” note 45, above.
20. Albany Register, 20 Apr. 1798.
21. Articles 23 and 24 of the state constitution covered the issue of official appointments. :11.
22. Melanchton Lloyd Woolsey (1754–1819) of Plattsburgh. JJ to Woolsey, 7 May 1798, Dft, NNC (EJ: 08979). Woolsey had been appointed as commandant for the Clinton County Regiment in March 1788. , 1: 142. Woolsey returned to his post and was soon promoted to brigadier general in August 1798 when the Clinton County militia was expanded to brigade strength. , 1: 456.
23. The artillery unit had been formed by Bauman at company strength in 1784, before expanding into a battalion and later a regiment some two years later. Emmons Clark, History of the Seventh Regiment of New York. 1806–1889, (2 vols.; New York, 1890), 1: 36–37; , 1: 110. For the refusal of the Council of Appointment to promote Bauman, see , 1: 329–30.
24. , 15–20, 21–23, quote on 23.
25. “An Act to amend the Act entitled An Act to organize the Militia of the state,” 11 Apr. 1796, , 51–52; , 24 (extract).
26. JJ to the Officers of the Artillery Regiment, 3 May 1796, LbkC, N: Governor’s Lbk. 2 (EJ: 03010); , 23.
27. , 24–25.
28. Ibid., 25–26.
29. Ibid., 28; JJ’s Message to the New York State Assembly, 16 Feb. 1797, , 2: 388–89.
30. JJ to Bauman, 15 Apr. 1797, LbkC, N: Governor’s Lbk. 1 (EJ: 03073); , 27–28; Minerva (New York), 15 Mar., Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser, Daily Advertiser, and Diary (all New York), 16 Mar., Greenleaf’s New York Journal and Herald (both New York), 18 Mar. 1797.
31. Bauman to JJ, [15 May 1797], below; , 29–30, 30–31; Diary and Herald, (both New York), 17 May; Register of the Times (New York), 19 May; Aurora General Advertiser (Philadelphia), 19 May; Albany Chronicle, 22 May, Otsego Herald (Cooperstown), 1 June 1797. Bauman forwarded copies of the pamphlet to the president and vice-president. Bauman to JA, 29 May 1797, ALS, MHi: Adams; Bauman to TJ, 29 May 1797, , 29: 403.
32. Commercial Advertiser (New York), 20 Apr.; Greenleaf’s New York Journal, 21 Apr.; New York Gazette, 23 Apr. 1798; , 1: 454.
34. JJ to Stevens, 26 May, 1798, below.
35. Stevens to JJ, 30 May 1798, below.
36. Ibid.
37. JJ to Stevens, 4 June 1798, ALS, NHi: Stevens (EJ: 00904). Enclosure: James McHenry to JJ, 15 May 1798, C in JJ’s hand.
38. Stevens to JJ, 11 Aug. 1798, C, NHi: Stevens (EJ: 00874); , 1: 470. At the time of his appointment, Stevens also accepted the post of commissary of military stores for New York. , 1: 461.
40. “An Act to augment the number of artillery-men in the city and county of New-York and to regulate the same,” 27 Aug. 1798, , 550–52. Stevens was formally appointed by brevet to brigadier general in April 1799. Commercial Advertiser (New York), 18 Apr.; Daily Advertiser (New York), 19 Apr. 1799; , 1: 470. To fill the officers’ vacancies within the expanded regiment, JJ, David Van Horne, the adjutant general of the state militia, and James M. Hughes, the brigade commander, opted to promote some of the unit’s long serving noncommissioned officers and matrosses. JJ to Matthew Clarkson, 10 Jan. 1799 (misdated 1798), ALS, NNYSL:Jay (EJ: 02869); , 2: 470–71.
41. Daily Advertiser, Minerva, Diary, and Greenleaf’s New York Journal (all New York), 1 July, Herald (New York), 5 July 1797; “An Act authorizing a detachment from the Militia of the United States,” 24 June 1797, , 1: 522.
42. “An Act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a Provisional Army,” 28 May, 1798, , 1: 558–61.
43. See for instance, the notice for the Federal Rangers in the New-York Gazette, 14 June 1798.
45. JJ urged the state legislature to pass reform measures to better accommodate the enlarged militia force. In March 1799, lawmakers in Albany heeded the governor’s advice and passed a comprehensive militia bill for cavalry and artillery units. JJ and his colleagues opposed the formation of volunteer companies from existing militia regiments, fearing that such moves would “promote disorganization, and subvert subordination.” Although a bill had passed both the state senate and assembly allowing this activity, the Council of Revision soon vetoed it. JJ’s Addresses to the New York State Legislature, 2 Jan. and 9 Aug. 1798, both below; JJ’s Message to the New York State Senate, 22 Mar. 1799, , 2: 439–40; Albany Centinel, 26 Mar. 1799 (extract); , 739–47; , 206–8; , 129; Albany Centinel, 5 Jan.; Albany Gazette and Albany Register, both 8 Jan.; Greenleaf’s New York Journal, 17 Jan. 1798; , 10; , 2: 403.
46. JJ to AH, 30 Aug. 1798, ALS, DLC: Hamilton (EJ: 10782); , 22: 169–170; , 4: 250; AH to JJ, 8 Sept. 1798, ALS, NNC (EJ: 05630); JJ to Clarkson, 7 Nov. 1798, LbkC, N: Governor’s Lbk. 1 (EJ: 03186); 13 Nov. 1798, ALS, NNYSL: Jay (EJ: 02867); JJ to Hughes, 13 Nov. 1798, ALS, PC: Robert S. Johnson (EJ: 05123); LbkC, N: Governor’s Lbk. 1 (03187).
47. The passage of the militia bill organizing cavalry and artillery units in March 1799 further muddled the question of who had authority over officer appointments. By late 1800, the governor and attorney general were tackling the issue of whether brigade majors in the cavalry would be chosen by the brigade commander or by the council of appointment. Josiah Ogden Hoffman to JJ, 14 Nov. 1800, ALS, N (EJ: 00993).
49. Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 31 July, 8 Aug. 1798.
51. AH to JJ, 27 Aug. 1798, below.
52. Ibid. JJ shared AH’s assessment that the dissenting militia officers who resigned their commissions had political motives for doing so. JJ to AH, 30 Aug. 1798, ALS, DLC: Hamilton (EJ: 10782); , 22: 169–170; , 4: 250.
53. “N.Y. Hibernian Volunteers.”
54. PAJ to JJ, 10 Aug. 1798, ALS, NNC (EJ: 06072); Dft, NNC (EJ: 11464). A city directory lists Edward Ferris as a grocer residing on 60 Roosevelt Street. , 177.
55. , 1: 449; Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 21 May; Greenleaf’s New York Journal, 23 May and 11 July 1798; , 332.
56. PAJ to JJ, 10 Aug. 1798, ALS, NNC (EJ: 06072); Dft, NNC (EJ: 11464); Argus, Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New York), 2 July 1798; , 84.
58. PAJ to JJ, 29 Dec. 1798, below; , 1: 463.
59. PAJ to JJ, 16 Mar. 1799, ALS, NNC (EJ: 06077). For more on the politicization of regular militia units, see the episode involving George I. Eaker, in PAJ to JJ, 13 May 1798, below.
61. , 1: 390.
62. Ibid., 469–70.
63. JJ’s Message to the New York State Senate, 22 Mar. 1798, , 2: 439–40; , 91–92.
64. “An Act further to amend the Laws relative to the Militia of this State,” 30 Mar. 1799, , 739–47.